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Abstract
In moral psychology, moral identity has been viewed as a central explanatory
construct in moral development linking morality and action. However, less is known
about its development across the lifespan. The present dissertation aimed to address the
limitations of previous research by using the personological approach to better
understand how the multifaceted construct of moral identity develops from the
understudied period of middle childhood to adolescence. The dissertation is separated
into three chapters that can be considered as three research topics framed within one
study tapping into the different layers of moral identity (see Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015).
All chapters were derived from the same sample of 190 participants (101 females,
M=13.00 years, SD=2.58) from three age groups of approximately equal size: middle
childhood (Grades 4-5; n=65), early adolescence (Grades 7-8; n=68), and midadolescence (Grades 10-11; n=57).
The first chapter examined the self-importance and context-specificity of moral
values (trait layer of moral identity). Age-related patterns were found on this layer of
moral identity and parental support was a positive predictor of moral identity. The second
chapter focused on moral identity motivation (characteristic adaptations layer of moral
identity) and as expected, moral identity motivation varied by both age and social
context, and was also predictive of moral behaviour. The third chapter focused on
narrative accounts of past morally relevant behaviour (narrative layer of moral identity).
Results revealed meaningful asymmetries in participants’ experiences and interpretations
of past (im)moral action that varied by age and context.
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Overall, the present dissertation demonstrated the utility of the personological
approach to moral identity development with each layer of moral identity manifesting
differentially throughout the lifespan. Importantly, the dissertation provided evidence that
moral identity development is context-dependent, begins to emerge in middle childhood
perhaps as a social moral identity, and progresses to be more autonomous with age.
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Moral Identity Development Across Middle Childhood and Adolescence
Morality is inherent in human interaction and one can expect morality to guide
some of our actions at any point in development (Nucci, 2004). Generally, morality
involves understanding others’ needs, interests, and desires while relating them to one’s
own, as well as expecting the responses of others (e.g., disapproval) to one’s own
behaviour (Thompson, Meyer, & McGinley, 2006). There are, nonetheless, differing
views of what morality entails, especially in terms of what makes an action “moral”
rather than simply a conventional or personal issue. Both Elliot Turiel (1983) and
Jonathan Haidt (2012) have proposed leading definitions that have been challenged. From
Turiel’s perspective, the moral domain entails actions that are harmful to others and are
universally judged as wrong. Haidt, on the other hand, proposed five moral foundations –
care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity – based on adaptive challenges humans
have faced in their evolutionary history and triggered by emotions such as sympathy,
anger, and disgust. Individuals and cultures seem to differ in the degree to which they
endorse loyalty, authority, and sanctity as well-defined moral foundations (e.g., Graham,
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2007, 2012). For example, Eastern participants showed
stronger concerns for loyalty, sanctity and authority compared to Western participants
(Haidt, 2007), while Liberals greatly endorse care and fairness whereas Conservatives
endorse all five moral foundations more equally (Graham et al., 2009). Moreover, in a
recent study, Jia, Krettenauer, & Li (in press), revealed that there are indeed culturally
specific moral attributes for Western (i.e., Canadian) versus Eastern (i.e., Chinese)
participants, but there are also shared moral attributes across both cultures. Morality has
universal components such that regardless of political orientation and cultural
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background, both caring for others and fairness are core moral foundations that lie at the
center of the moral domain for all (Jia et al., in press; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). Beyond
defining morality itself, an important aim of research in moral psychology is to
understand the relationship between morality and action.
In the beginning of the 20th century, Sigmund Freud’s (1935) psychoanalytic
theory greatly influenced the study of human development and proposed that morality,
specifically moral values, are transmitted entirely from parents to their children and thus
placed very little autonomy on children themselves. In the latter half of the 20th century,
Lawrence Kohlberg (1976) introduced his stage theory of moral development, which
placed emphasis on moral reasoning and moral judgment or rationality at the centre of
moral development and functioning. His stage theory was highly influential and
transformed the direction of the field to focus on moral reasoning as the predictor of
moral behaviour. Over the years, there were numerous criticisms of Kohlberg’s stage
theory given evidence suggesting that moral reasoning alone is not a strong predictor of
moral action (e.g., Blasi, 1983). Evidently, this led to new directions in moral
development theory and research to understand how moral reasoning leads to moral
action. In particular, Augusto Blasi (1983) introduced his self-model of moral functioning
and argued that moral identity is a major factor in bridging the gap between moral
judgment and action.
Moral Identity: What Is It?
Moral identity, defined as “the degree to which being a moral person is important
to an individual's identity" (Hardy & Carlo, 2011b, p. 212), has been a central
explanatory construct in moral development for several decades linking morality and
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action. The central premise of Blasi’s (1983) model of moral functioning is that if an
individual views moral values (e.g., honest, caring, fair) as fundamental to their sense of
self then they would be considered to have a strong moral identity, which would then lead
to moral behaviour. Recently, Hertz and Krettenauer (2016) conducted a meta-analysis to
examine the relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour from over one
hundred articles. They found a positive overall effect size suggesting that moral identity
is indeed related to moral behaviour. The moral identity construct is arguably a key
personality characteristic and a developmental construct subject to individual
development as well as an important element of positive development and everyday
moral functioning (e.g., Damon, 2004, 2006; Hardy & Carlo, 2005, 2011b). In fact,
Lapsley and Lasky (2001) stated, “The formation of moral identity is the clear goal of
both moral and identity development and these two developmental tracks are ideally
conjoined in the moral personality” (p. 358). As such, over the last few decades, the
construct has received considerable empirical interest with investigations on the construct
and its development. However, reliable empirical evidence supporting moral identity
development is limited (see Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015).
The surge in research on the moral identity construct began in the early 1980s
when Blasi (1980, 1983, 1984) published a series of papers that sparked a new
perspective in moral psychology. Blasi introduced the notion of moral self and identity at
a time when cognitive aspects of moral development were dominating the field; his
model posits the concept of moral identity as a bridge over the “moral judgment-action
gap” and thus central to understanding moral development. More specifically, he argued
that in order for moral judgment to lead to moral action, an individual’s moral values
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must be embedded into their sense of self and internalized as part of their moral identity
(Blasi, 1983). Since then, hundreds of published articles have built on the work of Blasi
and the field of moral psychology began to transition its focus from moral reasoning to
the moral self in childhood and moral identity in adolescence and beyond. At the same
time, scholars were also addressing a major limitation of Blasi’s model: the lack of an
empirical paradigm (Walker, 2014). In an overview chapter, Walker (2014) has
characterized three major overarching approaches used in the moral psychology field to
categorize the theoretical and empirical investigations of this construct: (1) trait-based,
(2) sociocognitive, and (3) personological approaches.
The trait-based approach – or the “having” side of personality (Walker, 2014) –
proposes that moral identity functions similar to personality traits. By having morally
relevant traits or attributing moral values as important to one’s sense of self, these traits
and self-important values should appear consistent across situation and contexts overtime
(Walker, 2014). The research from this approach has identified various moral traits that
are characteristic of a moral identity in adolescence and adulthood, such as: being honest,
caring, having integrity, and knowing what is wrong/right (e.g., Hardy, Walker, Olsen,
Skalski, & Basinger, 2011; Reimer, DeWitt Goudelock, & Walker, 2009; Walker, 1999;
Walker & Pitts, 1998). After identifying these moral traits, research has found that the
self-importance of these moral traits is predictive of moral behaviour (e.g., Hardy,
Walker, Gray, Ruchty, & Olsen, 2012).
In contrast, the sociocognitive approach to moral identity – the “doing” side of
personality (Walker, 2014) – emerged in the early 2000s and view moral identity as
malleable by situational factors that activate implicit and deliberative cognitive-affective
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processes or sociocognitive schemas that guide self-regulation and behaviour (Lapsley &
Narvaez, 2004). From this perspective, moral identity is the degree to which these “moral
schemas” are readily accessible such that those who have higher levels of moral identity
are more ready to efficiently respond to moral situations (Hardy, Krettenauer, & Hunt, in
press). Thus, moral identity is presumed to be implicit and automatic. For example,
Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, and Felps (2009) demonstrated the combined influence of
situational and dispositional factors on moral behaviour in a sample of undergraduate
students. They found that cooperative behaviour over time was only evidenced in the
moral priming condition (when moral identity was made salient) for those who already
reported high levels of moral identity (based on the centrality or strength of moral
identity). Therefore, this research supports the notion that situational context has a
considerable impact on moral identity functioning.
Both the trait-based and sociocognitive accounts of moral identity do not place
development at the forefront and heavily rely on a single layer of personality description
(i.e., behavioural traits) (Walker, 2014) and commitment to a particular personality
theory (Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015). The trait-based approach centres on temporal
stability and cross-context consistency, whereas the sociocognitive approach focuses on
malleability and situational-dependency. Moreover, these two accounts emphasize
different understandings of what moral identity entails: character (trait-based) versus
context (sociocognitive) (Walker, 2014). Evidently, a more integrative account is needed
beyond trait-based and sociocognitive approaches to moral identity to include other
aspects of personality (e.g., motivation, integrative life narratives) that are relevant to
moral functioning as well as to better explain the systematic development of moral
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identity over the lifespan. Recently, a more integrative framework – the personological
approach – has been established that addresses the aforementioned limitations of traitbased and sociocognitive accounts of moral identity to go beyond behaviour traits and
include the consideration of contexts, motivations, and life narratives (Walker, 2014).
This approach references various aspects of personality that address important areas of
moral identity development that perhaps were neglected in previous research
(Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015; Walker, 2014).
The Personological Approach to Moral Identity Development: A Three-Layer
Model
The personological approach to moral identity proposes that there are different
layers of moral identity that are equally important for describing a moral person
(Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015; Walker, 2014). This approach utilizes McAdams’ (2009)
theory of personality, specifically his three-layer model of personality, as an integrative
framework for the study of moral personality and development (Pratt & Hardy, 2014).
These three layers are: (1) dispositional traits, (2) characteristic adaptations, and (3)
integrative life narratives. At the first layer, moral identity can be reflected on the
broadest and least contextualized layer of moral traits or moral values attributed as
important to the self in general (e.g., being caring, honest, fair, trustworthy), which
account for behavioural consistencies (Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015). At the layer of
characteristic adaptations, moral identity can be reflected in motivational and social
cognitive aspects of personality. More specifically, motivations and goal orientations that
individuals uphold in various social contexts (e.g., being a caring parent), and thus may
be more variable across time and context (Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015; Pratt & Hardy,
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2014). At the third layer of integrative life narratives, moral identity can be reflected in
the degree to which moral values, moral themes, and/or self-related insights are salient in
individuals’ narratives about their past moral achievements (moral behaviour) and moral
failures (immoral behaviour). By studying moral identity from a personological approach
with McAdams’ framework, Krettenauer and Hertz (2015) suggest that moral identity is
not limited to one dimension, but that different aspects of moral identity can be shown at
each layer of personality, some of which may be more stable and trait-like, whereas
others may be more context-dependent and changeable over time.
To date, there is little research on the development of these personality layers
within the moral identity construct. Several studies have systematically investigated agerelated changes in moral identity during the adolescent and emerging adulthood years
with limited evidence despite models of moral identity development that consider this age
period crucial for moral identity formation (for an overview, see Krettenauer & Hertz,
2015). A critical review of the moral identity literature by Krettenauer and Hertz (2015)
revealed that the lack of empirical evidence for moral identity development might be due
to the limited age range included in studies, as well as conceptual and measurement
issues. In response to these limitations, Krettenauer and colleagues have developed a
research program using more sophisticated methodology in a series of published articles.
First, Krettenauer, Murua, and Jia (2016) expanded the age range in their sample
(14 to 65 years instead of only focusing on adolescents or adults) and also investigated
the context-differentiation of moral identity. For general self-descriptions, individuals
differentiate their self-descriptions depending on the social context and the social role
assumed (Diehl & Hay, 2007). As such, at the trait layer of moral identity, Krettenauer et
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al. (2016) aimed to examine both self-importance of moral values across social contexts,
as well as cross-context differentiation given that morality is not limited to only one
social context. They found age-related increases in the self-importance of moral values
and that cross-context differentiation of the self-importance of moral values increased
from adolescence to early adulthood, peaking at age 25 years then declining afterwards.
In other words, as individuals age, they increasingly attribute moral values as important
to the self; and during adolescence and emerging adulthood, individuals’ self-importance
of moral values become increasingly differentiated across contexts. Moreover, the selfimportance of these moral values was positively related to personality traits of
agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability.
Second, at the layer of characteristic adaptations of moral identity, Krettenauer
and Victor (2017) examined age-related change in one’s moral motivation for the selfimportance of moral values (i.e., moral identity motivation), while also considering
context-specificity. They argued that self-importance of moral values (layer one of moral
identity) need to be differentiated from moral identity motivation (layer two of moral
identity) given that an individuals’ reason or motive for the importance of a particular
moral value may vary. For example, people may agree that being honest is a selfimportant moral value, but one person may think it is important for self-interested reasons
(i.e., leaving a good impression on others) while another person believes it is important
for fairness reasons (i.e., treating others how they want to be treated). Numerous models
of ego and identity development have proposed a general developmental trend towards
greater levels of internal motivation with age (see Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015). In line
with theoretical expectations, Krettenauer and Victor (2017) found age-related increases
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in internal moral identity motivation, as well as context-dependent differentiation of
moral identity motivation such that individuals (age ranging from 14 to 65 years) were
more internally motivated to behave morally in the contexts of family and community
compared to school/work.
Finally, at the narrative layer of moral identity, individuals are able to create a
sense of connection and meaning over time by reflecting on autobiographical accounts of
life experiences and events, which evidently shapes one’s identity (e.g., Erikson
1959/1980; McAdams, 2001; McLean & Pasupathi, 2012). Compared to the other layers,
much less is known about the development of the narrative layer of moral identity,
though Proulx and Chandler (2009) proposed a general developmental trend of
adolescents’ self-views that reflect increased context-dependency such that one narrates
their good behaviours as internally motivated and their bad behaviours as externally
provoked. On the other hand, Krettenauer and Mosleh (2013) found that self-event
connection increases with age such that adults were more likely to make a connection
between past immoral behaviour and their current self compared to adolescents.
Moreover, internal moral motivation strongly predicted the strength of self-event
connections (i.e., the degree to which a past event is connected to the current self) as well
as the acceptance of conflicting events. Therefore, individuals with higher levels of
internal moral motivation were able to draw stronger connections between their past
(im)moral actions and their present self. At the same time, among children and
adolescents, Recchia, Wainryb, Bourne, and Pasupathi (2015) found that adolescents
were better at drawing self-related insights from their narrative accounts of past immoral
behaviour compared to children. Therefore, individuals do not simply externalize their
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immoral behaviours, but in fact may integrate them into their current self. Given these
discrepant findings that suggest perhaps adolescence is the age period wherein increased
context-dependency in moral motivations exists, more narrative approaches to
understanding moral identity development is needed. By combining the narrative
approach (layer three of moral identity) with the previous layers that suggest contextdifferentiation and dependency (layer one and layer two of moral identity), studying
developmental changes in moral identity across younger age periods is also possible.
More specifically, the ways in which children versus adolescents connect morally
relevant experiences to their sense of self, as well as describe their narratives depending
on both moral (i.e., transgressive, prosocial) and social contexts (i.e., family, friends)
have yet to be explored.
Evidently, developmental changes on these layers have been demonstrated in
separate empirical investigations, but not systemically in a single investigation and
primarily conducted with adolescents and beyond. Despite evidence of moral
development in childhood (e.g., Kochanska, 2002; Krettenauer, Campbell, & Hertz,
2013), the vast majority of research on moral identity focuses on its development in
adolescence and emerging adulthood – the “critical developmental period” – as scholars
argue that maturity and understanding of moral norms and values increase during this
time to better integrate morality and identity (e.g., Hardy & Carlo, 2011b). Nonetheless,
moral identity development is a lifelong process that is not restricted to adolescence or
emerging adulthood (Damon, 1996; Krettenauer et al., 2016; Lapsley & Stey, 2014).
Based on the research on toddlers’ and children’s moral self-concept, some researchers
have argued that the moral self may be a precursor to later moral identity (e.g.,
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Kochanska, Gross, Lin, & Nichols, 2002; Kochanska, Koenig, Barry, Kim, & Yoon,
2010; Krettenauer, 2018; Krettenauer et al., 2013; Sengsavang & Krettenauer, 2015).
Moreover, similar to moral identity, children’s moral self in middle childhood becomes
increasingly predictive of moral emotions and social behaviours (Krettenauer et al., 2013;
Sengsavang & Krettenauer 2015), but its potential development during this time is
understudied. In fact, Nucci (2004) identified the lack of developmental continuity from
childhood to adolescence as a major weakness of research on the moral identity construct.
Overview of The Present Dissertation Research
This dissertation research aimed to address the limitations of previous research to
better understand how the multifaceted concept of moral identity develops. Specifically,
the neglected developmental period of elementary school years up to adolescence was
examined utilizing the integrative personological approach to moral identity by drawing
on research that has been used with adolescence and emerging adults (Krettenauer &
Mosleh, 2013; Krettenauer et al., 2016; Krettenauer & Victor, 2017). In addition,
methodologies used with children and adolescents were drawn to adhere to the
dissertation’s younger sample of participants in middle childhood and adolescence.
Moreover, given Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological systems theory, human
development and thus identity development is a result of the dynamic and interactive
process between individuals and their various ecosystems from the most intimate or
personal ecological system that a person is in direct contact with (microsystem) to the
larger societal or cultural ecological system (macrosystem) that may indirectly affect
one’s development. These interactive processes in one’s environment includes but not
limited to: family, friends, school/work, neighbours in the community, cultural
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background, as well as the country in which one was raised. This indicates that identity
research, including this dissertation, must consider contexts most relevant to the
developmental age period under study. It is now clear that researchers need to expand the
scope of inquiry to be more inclusive and examine: (1) the three layers of moral identity,
while also focusing on (2) younger developmental periods, (3) individual differences in
moral development, as well as (4) social contexts, which have all been limited in the past.
A new empirical approach for assessing moral identity during this developmental
transition period was used that combines moral values, narratives, social contexts (i.e.,
family, friends, school) and moral contexts (i.e., prosocial, antisocial) along with teacherreports of student’s social behaviours as a measure of their moral behaviour. This
research from a personological approach tested a new methodology that is more inclusive
of all three layers of moral identity and expands the scope of past research for empirically
investigating individual and age-related differences in the development of moral identity.
Given the complexity and richness of each layer of moral identity, this
dissertation is separated into three chapters that can be considered as three research topics
all framed within one study. The chapters each tap into the different layers of moral
identity development as outlined by McAdams’ (2009) model of personality, while
incorporating teacher-reports of moral behaviour as well as self-reports of parent-child
relationship quality. It is important to note that these three chapters are part of the larger
dissertation project that utilized a multi-informant, mixed-method design with the same
sample of children and adolescents. Thus, only methods pertaining to each layer of moral
identity and accordingly each chapter was specifically described to reduce redundancy.
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The first chapter centres on the self-importance and context-specificity of moral
values (trait layer of moral identity). Conceptually, traits do not vary across contexts and
thus are usually generalized across all aspects of life, but empirically we1 investigated
this claim by including context-specificity similar to Krettenauer et al. (2016). The social
contexts most relevant to this age group, specifically family, friends and school, were
examined to better understand if the self-importance of moral values changed depending
on the social context. Given that positive parent-child relationship quality has been linked
to self-identity development in the moral domain (e.g., Kochanska, Aksan, & Joy, 2007;
Sengsavang & Krettenauer, 2015), the role of parent-child relationship quality at the trait
layer of moral identity was also studied.
The focus of the second chapter was moral identity motivation (characteristic
adaptations layer of moral identity), particularly the reasons or motives behind the selfimportance of moral values, and how it develops across middle childhood and
adolescence. Moreover, given that the characteristic adaptations or motivational layer of
personality is rooted in situation-specific or context-specific understanding that guide
behaviour, we also examined how moral identity motivation related to teacher-reports of
moral behaviour and self-reports of parent-child relationship quality.
Finally, the last chapter includes an explanation of how moral narratives provide
increased richness to understanding moral identity development (narrative layer of moral
identity), by specifically examining how children and adolescents describe and interpret

1

Throughout this dissertation, the personal pronoun "we" rather than "I" is used in order to acknowledge
that this project was a collaborative effort including myself, my thesis advisor (Dr. Krettenauer) and
students in our research lab who assisted with data collection and coding (notably Kathleen Bauer (née
Tamming) and Luc Saulnier). Nonetheless, the author of this thesis accepts full responsibility for all claims
made in this thesis document.
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past morally relevant behaviour. This was the first study to examine how both types of
moral experiences (transgressive, prosocial), as well as how the social context (family,
friends) in which the moral failures and moral achievements occurred may change the
way individuals construe these experiences.
Taken together, this dissertation research (1) utilized recent innovative moral
identity research methodologies that has been completed mainly with adolescents and
adults and expanded it to a younger developmental period, and (2) comprehensively
examined moral identity development as a multifaceted, context-dependent self-structure,
while investigating its association to parenting, on the one hand, and moral behaviour, on
the other. Based on the current literature discussed above, the general research question
of this dissertation project is: how does moral identity form in the course of individual
development during the understudied transition period from middle childhood to
adolescence?

CHAPTER I: The Self-Importance of Moral Values and Context-Specificity Across
Middle Childhood and Adolescence
Traditionally, research on personality and identity has focused on trait-based
approaches, especially after the five-factor model of personality (also known as the Big
Five model) became widely accepted (see McAdams & Pals, 2006). Moral identity can
also be examined from the personality layer of traits when considering the stability and
cross-situational consistency of moral identity similarly to traits. Given that moral
identity may function similar to personality traits, the importance of moral traits or moral
values to one’s sense of self should be consistent across contexts and time (Walker,
2014). Morality (i.e., promoting other people’s welfare, harm avoidance, caring for
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others, fairness) requires action that is guided by a person’s moral intentions which
provides the behaviour with moral meaning within the framework of the person’s moral
understanding (Blasi, 2005). Indeed, moral identity has been shown to be highly
influential for everyday moral functioning (e.g., Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016; Johnston &
Krettenauer, 2011) and thus an important construct in the area of moral development.
Over the last several decades, this construct has gained popular interest as a predictor of
moral behaviour in multiple disciplines, though its development has been much less
explored.
Moral identity is traditionally seen as the extent to which moral values are
integrated into an individual’s sense of self (see Hardy & Carlo, 2011b). Unsurprisingly,
there are individual differences in the extent to which moral values are integrated into
one’s sense of self. For instance, moral values such as being trustworthy, honest, or fair
might be central to some people’s identity, whereas nonmoral values such as being
outgoing, popular, and independent are considered more important for others. According
to Krettenauer et al. (2016), “these individual differences are attributable to different
developmental trajectories, where some individuals were able to achieve a higher level of
morality-self integration than others” (p. 972). Historically, the majority of the research
on moral identity development is focused on the “critical developmental period” of
adolescence and emerging adulthood (cf. Blasi, 2005; Frimer & Walker, 2009; Hardy &
Carlo, 2011b), however this does not imply that moral identity development is limited to
this age period (Damon, 1996; Lapsley & Stey, 2014). Given that there has been little
empirical evidence for age-graded change in adolescence or emerging adulthood (see
Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015), amongst other leaders in the field, Hardy and Carlo (2011b)
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suggest that there is limited knowledge about the developmental trajectories of moral
identity.
Moral identity can be found in earlier developmental periods, though this has
often been referred as the moral self rather than moral identity per se. Currently, it is
unknown when moral identity emerges, but scholars have provided valuable insights into
the development of a moral self as a precursor of later moral identity (e.g., Kochanska,
2002; Kochanska et al., 2010; Krettenauer, 2018; Krettenauer et al., 2013; Sengsavang &
Krettenauer, 2015). Moreover, precursors to moral self development include but not
limited to: early conscience development of moral emotions and internalization of rules,
as well as understanding of mental states in others and oneself (theory of mind) (for an
overview, see Thompson, 2014). According to Krettenauer (2013, 2018), the integration
of self and morality (i.e., moral selfhood) is multifaceted and develops in childhood
through a three-layer model of moral self that occurs at different points in time: moral
self as an intentional agent (ages 3- to 5-years with instrumental intentions such as one’s
self-interest), volitional agent (ages 6- to 8-years with intentions to act morally beginning
to move from external to internal obligation), and identified agent (moral conduct reflects
one’s self-ideal). Early occurring processes involved in moral self-identification, such as
rule internalization (Kochanska & Thompson, 1997), become further integrated into
one’s sense of self when these moral rules become associated with children’s ideal self,
which leads to an emerging moral identity (Krettenauer, 2013). Evidently, the concept of
the moral self primarily refers to motivational processes and is conceptually related to
moral identity, but does not have all aspects of a fully developed moral identity. The
integration of morality and identity during adolescence and adulthood is based on an
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increased sense of agency and responsibility for one’s thoughts, emotions, and
behaviours with greater concern for self-consistency (see Hardy & Carlo, 2011b).
Children, on the other hand, have a lower sense of moral responsibility compared to
adolescents and adults given children’s limited perception of agency and responsibility
(e.g., Nunner-Winkler, 2007). At the same time, Lapsley (2015) argued that “we should
also not conclude too hastily that childhood is a theoretical void with nothing of interest
to contribute to a developmental story for moral identity…A plausible developmental
account of the moral personality would not begin in adolescence…but in early
childhood” (p. 168). Therefore, although research on children’s moral self has been
discussed in the context of moral identity development (Hardy & Carlo, 2011b; Lapsley
& Stey, 2014), the present study focused on moral identity development during the
neglected age period of middle childhood to adolescence to better understand general
age-related trends beginning prior to adolescence.
At the trait layer of moral identity from McAdams’ (2009) model of personality,
moral identity is reflected in the self-importance of moral traits or moral values. Traits
are commonly understood to be relatively stable and equally apply to various areas of
life, but individuals do make context-specific modifications in their overall selfdescriptions based on their expected social role (i.e., child, student, friend) (Diehl & Hay,
2007). As such, the development of personality cannot be restricted to only mean-level
changes, as one considers the general developmental trend of self-concept differentiation
and integration across contexts over time (see Harter, 2012). This context-specific
differentiation of self-representation can be seen as an important developmental
achievement with the construction of multiple selves reflecting cognitive growth and
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increased differentiation in social role expectations, especially during early to midadolescence where there is an increased differentiation in self-descriptions across various
social contexts of family, friends, and school (Harter, 2012; Harter, Bresnick, Bouchey,
& Whitesell, 1997; Harter & Monsour, 1992). Furthermore, in a sample of participants
aged 14 to 65 years, the mean-level of moral identity (averaged across contexts of family,
school/work, and community) significantly increased in the adult years, while crosscontext differentiation revealed a nonlinear trend peaking at age 25 years (Krettenauer et
al., 2016). Thus, with age, one’s self-descriptions seem to depend less on their self-view
in the context of their friends, family, romantic partner, or co-worker. However, this selfconcept integration and differentiation in moral values has not been empirically
addressed during the transition period of middle childhood and adolescence.
Given that morality pertains to all areas of life (e.g., family, friends, school) but
has somewhat different demand characteristics in each area (Krettenauer et al., 2016), the
self-integration of moral values may be context-dependent. In fact, moral identity has
been conceptualized as a “context-dependent self structure that becomes differentiated
and (re)integrated in the course of development and that involves a broad range of value
orientations” (Krettenauer et al., 2016, p. 981). Consequently, when investigating moral
identity at the trait layer, we need to consider cross-context differentiation as an
important aspect of moral identity development in addition to traditional mean-level
change. Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological systems theory suggests that individual's
sense of identity is a result of their interactions with others in their lives at home, at
school, at work, and in their community and society at large, over time. Thus, any
empirical investigation examining morality must take into account contexts on multiple
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levels in order to understand moral development. For the developmental age period
between middle childhood and adolescence, the contexts of family, friends, and school
are of utmost importance. Although most individuals are moral (i.e., have moral values),
it is imperative to better understand how the self-importance of moral values differs with
age as well as differs depending on social context.
The existing literature on moral development has been relatively consistent in
demonstrating how the family, specifically the parents, influences children’s moral
development (for an overview, see Sengsavang & Krettenauer, in press). In terms of selfidentity development, parenting has been predictive of moral self or moral identity
amongst young children (Kochanska et al., 2007), in elementary-aged children
(Sengsavang & Krettenauer, 2015), as well as in adolescents (e.g., Hardy, Bhattacharjee,
Reed & Aquino, 2010; Hart, Atkins, & Ford, 1999; Patrick & Gibbs, 2012). For example,
positive parent-child relationships characterized by high levels of parental support and
low levels of negative interaction predicted higher scores in children’s moral self
(Sengsavang & Krettenauer, 2015). Nonetheless, an empirical measure of moral identity
that also accounts for various social contexts (e.g., family, school, community) has only
been recently applied to moral development research (for an overview, see Krettenauer et
al., 2016). The present study aimed to replicate previous studies that link parenting to
moral identity development using Krettenauer et al.’s (2016) moral identity interview to
assess individual’s moral identity in three different social contexts (family, friends, and
school) during the transition period from middle childhood to adolescence.
In summary, following research on personality development and moral identity
development across the lifespan, the present study expected two age-related trends in
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moral identity development during the transition period of middle childhood and
adolescence. As the first study to explore age-related patterns in mean-level of the selfimportance of moral values (averaged across contexts of family, friends, and school)
from middle childhood to adolescence, it was unclear what the trends would be given that
Krettenauer et al. (2016) found increases with age from adolescence to middle age, but
when investigating younger age groups, Krettenauer et al. (2013) found a slight decrease
with age over the elementary school years. However, as the mean-level increased during
the transition period from adolescence to adulthood in Krettenauer et al. (2016), we
expected a similar pattern during the transition from middle childhood and adolescence.
Secondly, cross-context differentiation of moral identity was also expected to
demonstrate a linear increase during this age period given that Harter and colleagues
(1992, 1997, 2012) found increased differentiation in adolescence. Finally, a replication
of previous findings was expected wherein positive parent-child relationship quality (i.e.,
high levels of parental support, low levels of parent-child negative interaction) will be
predictive of moral identity. The present study was the first to examine mean-level and
cross-context differentiation of moral identity amongst individuals from the elementary
school years through the adolescent years, while also exploring the role of parent-child
relationship quality. Accordingly, we may be better able to delineate age-related trends in
moral identity as well as add to the existing literature on parenting and moral identity
development.
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Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 190 participants (101 females) from three different age
groups of approximately equal size: middle childhood (Grades 4-5; n = 65; M = 10.11
years, SD = 0.71), early adolescence (Grades 7-8; n = 68, M = 13.26 years, SD = 0.53),
and mid-adolescence (Grades 10-11; n = 57; M = 16.00 years, SD = 0.67). Age group was
unrelated to gender, c2 (2, N = 190) = 3.66, p = .16. Table 1 provides a summary of all
demographic variables by age group. Upon receiving ethics approval from Wilfrid
Laurier University’s Research Ethics Board, the Waterloo Region District School Board
(WRDSB), and the Waterloo Catholic District School Board (WCDSB), principals from
local elementary schools, middle schools, and high schools were contacted in order to
distribute information letters and consent forms to eligible teachers who were interested
in participating. All participants provided informed consent before participating.
Participants received a $7 (Grades 4-5 and Grades 7-8) or $20 (Grades 10-11)
honorarium for their time and were entered into a raffle to win one of three iTunes gift
cards valued at $25. All participating schools also received a classroom donation of $5
(Grades 4-5 and Grades 7-8) or $10 (Grades 10-11) for each participating student. All
participants were treated in accordance to the American Psychological Association’s
‘Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct’ (American Psychological
Association, 2008).
At the time of data collection, all participants were residing in South-Western
Ontario. Most participants (65.78%) self-identified as Canadian of European descent. Of
participants, 25.13% had an Asian (South, East, South-East) background (e.g., Pakistani,
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Indian, Filipino, Taiwanese, Korean), 5.35% had an African background (e.g.,
Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan), and 3.74% self-identified as Arabian or Arabic. In
the present sample, ethnic background (European Canadian: 1 = yes, 0 = no) was not
related to age group c2 (2, N = 187) = 3.90, p = .14, or gender, c2 (1, N = 187) = 0.74, p =
.39 (see Table 1).
For assessing socioeconomic status (SES), the validated International SocioEconomic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) was used (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, &
Treiman, 1992). Participants were asked to provide descriptions of their adult caregivers’,
typically mother’s and father’s, current occupations (most recent occupation, if
unemployed). Job descriptions were coded according to the International Standard
Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) and transferred into the ISEI. Parents’ ISEI
scores were averaged and could theoretically range from 10 to 90 with a midpoint of the
scale at 50. In the present sample, participants’ ISEI score was just slightly above average
(see Table 1). The three age groups did differ with regard to SES, F(2, 185) = 6.76, p =
.001 and post-hoc tests (Scheffé’s; p < .05) revealed that SES for the youngest age group
(middle childhood) were significantly lower than the two older age groups (early
adolescence and mid-adolescence).
Measures and Procedures
This study included a mixed-method cross-sectional design with 45-minute semistructured interviews and a 15-minute self-report questionnaire. This study was part of a
larger mixed-method cross-sectional and multi-informant study; thus, only procedures
and measures relevant to the present study are discussed.
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The interview was based on Krettenauer et al.’s (2016) moral identity interview
procedure conducted to assess individual’s moral identity in three different social
contexts (family, friends, and school). The questionnaire was used to assess social
desirability response bias, socioeconomic status, and parent-child relationship quality.
Interviews were audiotaped, transcribed verbatim, and de-identified to maintain
confidentiality and privacy of all participants. In the interview, both open-ended and
standardized response formats were used, but only standardized responses were analyzed
in the present study.
Children and adolescents were interviewed individually in a private room at the
child’s school or a university’s laboratory. The interview began with the interviewer
briefly explaining why he/she is there to talk to the child, as well as the purpose of the
laptop computer (to record participant’s responses), digital recording device (to record
the interview), and the picture boards (to make it easier to talk about personal attributes).
Moreover, the interviewer ensured that the child was comfortable with saying “I don’t
know” if he/she was unsure of their response rather than guessing. Finally, the
interviewer reassured the participant about the importance of his/her honesty and that
their responses were strictly confidential. After the participant provided oral assent, the
interviewer began the interview then afterwards gave them the questionnaire.
Moral identity interview. The Moral Identity Interview procedure for assessing
moral identity from Krettenauer et al. (2016) was slightly modified for the middle
childhood and adolescence age group of the present study. The original modification in
Krettenauer et al. (2016) was based on the widely validated Good Self-Assessment
(Arnold, 1993), which has been extensively used with adolescents and adults, to address
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80 value-attributes derived from previous studies that investigated individual’s
prototypical conceptions of a moral person, as well as the addition of context-specific
assessment of moral identity (for full procedure, see Krettenauer et al., 2016). In the
present study, this interview procedure was further modified for the younger age group
spanning from middle childhood to adolescence, including ensuring that the language
was developmentally appropriate and that that tasks were suitable to the younger sample.
Specifically, 13 value-attributes from five value domains were chosen based on how
often the various 80 value-attributes were selected as most important in the adolescent
group (14-18 years) in Krettenauer et al. (2016).2 According to the frequency analysis,
the top value-attributes selected by the adolescent group from Krettenauer et al.’s (2016)
study were: honest, trustworthy, genuine, responsible, forgiving, caring, selfless,
accepting, respectful, non-judgmental, fair, compassionate, and knows what is
right/wrong. The percentage of these attributes chosen by the adolescent group in
Krettenauer et al.’s (2016) study as most important was 31.30% to 59.70%.
To assess the self-importance of moral values, participants were given a set of
magnetic labels with the value-attributes and a diagram that displayed four nested circles
representing the varying degrees of self-importance. Participants were asked to create a
pictorial self-portrait similar to the method developed by Harter and Monsour (1992) for
adolescents when assessing the context-specificities in their self-concept. There were
three diagrams with different headings, each representing the different social contexts:

2

Krettenauer et al.’s (2016) study did not include participants in middle childhood, but the value-attributes
selected most by their youngest age group of adolescents resonated with the present study’s younger
sample given that prior to beginning the Moral Identity Interview, the interviewer would ask the openended question of “From your point of view, what describes a highly moral person?” and many of the 13value-attributes were spontaneously described across all three age groups, including the youngest age group
of middle childhood.
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family (“How important is it for you to be ___ in the context of your family?”), friends
(“How important is it for you to be ___ in the context of your friends?”), and school
(“How important is it for you to be ___ in the context of your school?”). Each diagram
was presented consecutively, where participants were instructed to place each label in the
circle that represents its level of importance to the self from 1 = not important to me to 5
= extremely important to me (for an illustration, see Figure 1). The order of the diagrams
was based on computer randomization for each participant in order to control for order
effects of social context. Therefore, various statistical indices were calculated based on
this procedure to reflect: (1) the self-importance of moral values (mean-level across
social contexts) and (2) cross-context differentiation of moral identity.
Mean-level of moral identity. To assess mean-level of participants’ moral
identity, the self-importance ratings of the value-attributes (1 = not important to me to 5 =
extremely important to me) were averaged across all social contexts and then combined
into a single scale with higher scores indicating higher levels of moral identity. Internal
consistency for this scale was α = .87 with a sample mean of 3.82 and a standard
deviation of 0.38.
Cross-context differentiation of moral identity. In order to assess cross-context
differentiation of moral identity, we calculated the standard deviation for each valueattribute across social contexts. The internal consistency of this sum score was α = .67.
Similar to Krettenauer et al. (2016), standardized residuals were computed by regressing
cross-context differentiation on mean-level of moral identity using standard linear
regression techniques (for a discussion, see also Baird, Le, & Lucas, 2006). Thus, this
score reflected cross-context differentiation that is independent of mean-level, with
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higher scores indicated greater levels of cross-context differentiation of the selfimportance of moral values.
Social desirability. In order to measure social desirability response bias,
participants were asked to complete the validated Children’s Social Desirability Short
(CSD-S) scale consisting of 14 items from the Children’s Social Desirability scale
originally developed by Crandall, Crandall, and Katkovsky (1965) (see Appendix A).
Baxter et al. (2004) chose 14 items from the original CSD for the CSD-S. Recently,
Miller et al. (2014) further demonstrated the CSD-S scale’s adequate test-retest reliability
and internal consistency for subgroups of children formed by academic achievement,
gender, socioeconomic status, and BMI percentile. Participants were presented with 14
questions and responded to each item using a dichotomous YES versus NO response
format. For example, “Have you ever felt like saying unkind things to a person?” and
“Do you always listen to your parents?”. Participants received one-point for each answer
keyed as socially desirable. The CSD-S scale scores ranged from 0 to 14, with higher
scores indicating a greater tendency to respond in a socially desirable way. For the
present study, internal consistency for this scale was α = .78 with a sample mean of 3.74
and a standard deviation of 3.01.
Parent-child relationship quality. Participants completed the widely used
Network of Relationships Inventory-Social Provisions Version (NRI-SPV; Furman &
Buhrmester, 1985) to assess a broad range of relationship qualities. The 13-item ‘short
form’ of the NRI was used in the present study to reduce the ‘questionnaire load’ for
children (see Appendix B). The short-form includes two factors, seven items representing
‘support’ (e.g., “How much does this person help you figure out or fix things?” and “How
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much does this person treat you like you’re admired and respected”) and six items
representing ‘negative interaction’ (e.g., “How much do you and this person disagree or
quarrel with each other?” and “How much do you and this person hassle or nag one
another?”). The reliability and validity of this measure has been empirically supported in
previous research (Furman & Buhrmester, 1985) and the two factors have shown strong
reliability (e.g., Oberlander & Black, 2011) with Cronbach’s alpha of both factors being α
= .89.
Participants answered questions for relationships with their adult caregivers,
typically a mother figure (e.g., biological/adopted mother, step-mother/father’s
significant other, or other including another father) and a father figure (e.g.,
biological/adopted father, step-father/mother’s significant other, or other including
another mother). It is important to note the complex family make-up in today’s modern
society and this was communicated to participants prior to them completing the measure.
Participants used the same set of items to answer questions about both adult caregivers.
They were asked to rate the extent each individual satisfies each item based on a fourpoint scale ranging from (1) little or none to (4) extremely much. An average score was
computed for both subscales (e.g., maternal and paternal support, maternal and paternal
negative interaction).
In the present sample, internal consistency scores were high with the following
Cronbach’s alphas: maternal support α = .80, maternal negative interaction α = .90,
paternal support α = .83, and paternal negative interaction α = 90. Correlational analyses
indicated a significant positive association between maternal and paternal support (r(166)
= .34, p < .001) as well as between maternal and paternal negative interaction (r(166) =
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.34, p < .001). Accordingly, these pairs of variables were aggregated to create summary
variables representing parental support (i.e., participants’ perceived support from both
caregivers) and parent-child negative interaction (i.e., participant’s perceived negative
interaction with both caregivers). Internal consistencies were high for both parental
support and parent-child negative interaction, α = .83 and α = .86 respectively. Like
Sengsavang and Krettenauer (2015), the sample mean was higher for parental support (M
= 2.98, SD = .51) than for parent-child negative interaction (M = 1.83, SD = .53).
Results
Preliminary analyses were conducted to identify if gender, social desirability,
ethnicity and/or SES would be included as control variables in the main analyses.3 A
multiple regression with mean-level of moral identity as the dependent variable and
gender, social desirability response bias, ethnicity and SES as predictors, yielded a
significant overall effect, F(4, 163) = 5.36, p < .001. Social desirability response bias was
a significant predictor of individual’s mean-level of moral identity, β = .33, p < .001.
However, gender, ethnicity, and SES were not significantly related to mean-level of
moral identity, βgender = -.03, p = .66, βethnicity = .05, p = .53, and βSES = .04, p = .62,
respectively. Another multiple regression with cross-context differentiation of moral
identity on gender, social desirability, ethnicity and SES yielded a significant overall
effect, F(4, 163) = 3.94, p = .004. Social desirability response bias and ethnicity were
significant predictors of individual’s cross-context differentiation, β = -.25, p = .002 and
β = -.17 p = .024, respectively. However, gender and SES were not significantly related

3

All analyses for this dissertation project were based on two-tailed hypothesis testing using an alpha level
of .05 for all statistical tests.
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to cross-context differentiation, β = -.04, p = .61 and β = -.05, p = .50, respectively. As a
result of these preliminary analyses, only social desirability response bias was used as a
control variable in the main analyses with mean-level of moral identity. For main
analyses with cross-context differentiation, both social desirability response bias and
ethnicity were used as control variables. Assumptions of normality, linearity, and
homoscedasticity were met.
Mean-Level of Moral Identity and Age
The bivariate correlation between mean-level of moral identity (averaged across
contexts) and age revealed a significant negative relationship, r(187) = -.22, p = .002.
Next, a multiple regression was performed to examine the effect of age group on meanlevel of moral identity. Age group was entered as two dummy variables (age1 = early
adolescents in Grades 7-8, age2 = mid-adolescents in Grades 10-11) with the reference
group as the youngest age group (middle childhood in Grades 4-5) in Step 1 followed by
social desirability entered in Step 2 (see Table 2). Overall, model 1 was significant, F(2,
169) = 6.29, p = .002, with age2 as the only significant effect and age1 was marginally
significant, suggesting that participants in early adolescence (M = 3.82, SD = .41) and
mid-adolescence (M = 3.70, SD = .34) have lower scores in mean-level of moral identity
than participants in middle childhood (M = 3.93, SD = .36). There was a significant DR2
= .078, p < .001 when social desirability was added to the model, F(3, 168) = 9.67, p <
.001, with social desirability and age2 as significant effects. The effect of age2 dropped
from -.30 to -.21, but still remained significant above and beyond the effect of social
desirability. Age1 was no longer significant once social desirability was entered into the
model. Mean-level of moral identity appeared to decrease with age, such that participants
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in middle childhood had significantly higher mean-levels of moral identity than midadolescents, even after controlling for social desirability.
Cross-Context Differentiation of Moral Identity and Age
The bivariate correlation between cross-context differentiation of moral identity
(standardized residual score, controlling for mean-level) and age revealed a significant
positive relationship, r(187) = .21, p = .004. Similar to the mean-level analysis, a multiple
regression was performed to examine the effect of age group on cross-context
differentiation of moral identity. The two age group dummy variables were entered in
Step 1 followed by social desirability and ethnicity in Step 2 (see Table 2). Overall,
model 1 was significant, F(2, 167) = 4.18, p = .017, with age2 as the only significant
effect and age1 was marginally significant, suggesting that participants in middle
childhood (M = -.05, SD = .15) had less cross-context differentiation than participants in
early adolescence (M = .01, SD = .14) and mid-adolescence (M = .04, SD = .17). When
social desirability and ethnicity were added to the model, there was a significant DR2 =
.057, p = .006, F(4, 165) = 4.85, p = .001, with social desirability, ethnicity, and age2 as
significant effects. The effect of age2 dropped from .25 to .18, but still remained
significant above and beyond the effect of social desirability and ethnicity. Age1 was no
longer significant once social desirability and ethnicity were entered into the model. The
findings indicated that cross-context differentiation in moral identity appears to increase
with age especially between middle childhood and mid-adolescence, even after
controlling for social desirability and ethnicity.
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Effects of Parent-Child Relationship Quality on Mean-Level of Moral Identity
The bivariate correlations between parent-child relationship quality and meanlevel of moral identity revealed a significant positive relationship between parental
support and moral identity, r(169) = .21, p = .005, as well as a significant negative
relationship between parent-child negative interaction and moral identity, r(169) = -.20, p
= .01. A multiple regression was performed to examine the effect of parent-child
relationship quality on mean-level of moral identity. Both parental support and parentchild negative interaction were entered in Step 1 followed by social desirability and age
in years entered in Step 2. Overall, model 1 was significant, F(2, 168) = 5.48, p = .005,
with parental support (β = .16, p = .04) significantly and parent-child negative interaction
(β = -.13, p = .09) marginally predicting moral identity. Once social desirability and age
in years were added to the model as control variables, there was a significant DR2 = .105,
p < .001, F(4, 166) = 8.28, p < .001, with parental support (β = .17, p = .03) and social
desirability (β = .28, p < .001) as significant effects. Evidently, parental support
positively and significantly predicted mean-level of moral identity above and beyond
social desirability, age, and parent-child negative interaction.
Discussion
The present study was the first of its kind to examine mean-level and crosscontext differentiation of moral identity with a younger sample during the transition from
middle childhood (Grades 4-5) to adolescence (Grades 7-8 and Grades 10-11), which is
significant given that development does not begin at adolescence but is a lifelong process.
Thus, the present study was able to shed some insight onto how moral identity develops
prior to adolescence. More specifically, this study extended previous work by (1)
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investigating earlier developmental periods given that moral identity development is not
limited to the “critical developmental period” of adolescence and emerging adulthood, (2)
examining moral identity defined as the context-dependent self-integration of moral
values, and (3) exploring the role of parenting in this context-dependent examination of
moral identity. In summary, results indicated that mean-level of moral identity (averaged
across the three contexts) decreased with age, such that children had significantly higher
levels of moral identity than adolescents, even after controlling for social desirability.
Cross-context differentiation of moral identity, on the other hand, significantly increased
with age, especially between middle childhood and mid-adolescence. Finally, in line with
previous research, parental support positively predicted mean-level of moral identity,
above and beyond social desirability, age, and parent-child negative interaction. In the
following, these findings and their implications are discussed in detail.
In contrast to our hypothesis, mean-level of moral identity decreased from middle
childhood to adolescence. Although Krettenauer et al. (2016) found a linear increase in
mean-level of moral identity with age and sampled four different age groups, their
youngest group consisted of adolescents aged 14-18 years, whereas the present study’s
three age groups consisted of children as young as 8 years up to adolescents 17 years of
age. Thus, it is difficult to compare our findings with younger age groups to Krettenauer
et al.’s (2016) older sample. In an earlier investigation with a younger sample (aged 5- to
12-years-old), Krettenauer et al. (2013) also found a decrease in children’s moral selfconcept with age. Therefore, the decline in mean-level of moral identity in the present
study may be attributable to the developmental period of the sample itself, specifically
the positivity bias that is likely inherent in our younger sample. To date, there is limited
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empirical research in moral identity development from childhood to adolescence, but we
can draw on research on the development of self-representations and self-concepts to
elucidate the present study’s findings on moral identity.
It has been well documented that children’s self-view is overly positive compared
to adolescents and adults (see Harter, 1999, 2012) and self-serving biases are present in
children and adults, but especially strong in children ages 8- to 11-years-old (for a
review, see Trzesniewski, Kinal, & Donnellan, 2011). Overall, Trzesniewski et al. (2011)
suggests that the developmental trends in positivity bias are likely due to cognitive
maturation, life experiences, as well as changes in social contexts. In fact, a recent
longitudinal study found decreases in mean-level global and domain-specific selfconcepts from late childhood to early adolescence and concluded that both biological
(puberty) and contextual factors (school transition) play an important role in differences
in individuals’ self-views during this sensitive transition period from late childhood to
early adolescence (Schaffhuser, Allemand, & Schwarz, 2017). Although Schaffhuser et
al. (2017) did not specifically examine the moral domain, given Schaffhuser et al.’s
(2017) decrease in the mean-levels from late childhood to early adolescence, as well as
Krettenauer et al.’s (2016) increase in mean-levels from adolescence to old age, it is
apparent that the developmental trajectory of one’s self-identity may not be as linear as
previous research may suggest.
It is plausible that an individual’s self-view, including how they see and describe
themselves as a moral person, may temporarily change as they transition into adolescence
and become exposed to different experiences (e.g., puberty, school transitions, new
friends) and thus other factors (e.g., social) or characteristics (e.g., non-moral values such
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as being popular or cool) may take priority over moral values. Evidently, biological,
psychological, and social factors need to be explored as to how they influence the moral
domain given the important implications. In particular, if the decline in mean-level of
moral identity is attributable to biological or psychological factors, educators and parents
need to know that this is a vital developmental period to promote moral identity
development. For instance, as individuals experience puberty and transition into high
school, they might be more concerned with the need to belong and “fit in” with their
peers rather than upholding their moral values. It is also important to note that our
findings are statistically significant with the effect sizes being small to moderate (rage and
mean-level

= -.22 and rage and cross-context differentiation = .21), indicating that age indeed has an

impact on moral identity, but that other factors need to be considered simultaneously.
Therefore, in terms of practical significance of our findings, it appears that other factors
may contribute to the decrease in mean-level of moral identity and increase in crosscontext differentiation during this age period – more specifically, perhaps puberty and the
transition to high school. During this sensitive developmental period, adolescents may
especially need greater support and education regarding moral values both at home and at
school with educators and teachers considering the role of peer pressure and puberty
during these important discussions. Given the various designs and samples with differing
age ranges in the existing literature, future research needs to consider biological and
social factors, as well as incorporate a wider age range of participants that begin in
middle childhood and expands into adulthood to better understand the probable nonlinear trends in mean-levels of moral identity development.
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We reasoned earlier, any investigation of moral identity at the trait layer needs to
consider cross-context differentiation as well as mean-level given that the self-integration
of moral values may be context-dependent. In line with Bronfenbrenner’s (1979)
ecological systems theory, as well as the differentiation and integration principles of selfdevelopment across contexts and time (Harter, 2012), when assessing moral identity
separately for the social contexts of family, friends, and school, it was found that crosscontext differentiation of moral identity increased between middle childhood and
adolescence. As such, throughout this developmental period, individual’s sense of moral
identity seemed to be reflective of the interactions and relationships in their lives at
home, with friends, and at school. This finding provides further validation (in addition to
Krettenauer et al., 2016) of the moral identity measure for this younger sample and
reinforces Harter’s (2012) argument of context-specific differentiation of selfrepresentations, especially during early to mid-adolescence.
During this developmental period, individuals are reaching the important
developmental milestone of cognitive growth and greater differentiation as a function of
social contexts and socialization pressures (Daniel et al., 2012; Harter, 2012; Harter et al.,
1997; Harter & Monsour, 1992; Krettenauer et al., 2016). As individuals are experiencing
these developmental changes from middle childhood to adolescence, their values and thus
the way they may perceive or describe themselves become increasingly differentiated
across contexts. From a developmental perspective, this makes sense given that in
adolescence, individuals are experiencing new things, new environments and new peer
groups and thus their sense of self and who they are is more differentiated and less
integrated during this time period. Once in adulthood, individuals are more likely to
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integrate value priorities and cohesively perceive themselves as more similar across
contexts or different areas of life, as suggested by Krettenauer et al. (2016). This finding
has important implications for educators and parents as they discuss morality and moral
values with their children and students given that it is context-dependent. Educators and
parents need to be aware that discussions about morality cannot be overly generalized
and should be discussed with respect to specific contexts. This finding also largely
corresponds with the empirical findings reported by Daniel et al. (2012) and Krettenauer
et al. (2016). In the first empirical study of adolescents’ value differentiation, Daniel et al.
(2012) found that mid-adolescents demonstrated greater value differentiation than early
adolescents. When examining only moral values, Krettenauer et al. (2016) found a
nonlinear effect of age on cross-context differentiation of moral identity such that there
was an increase from adolescence to emerging adulthood and then declined in the older
adult years. It remains an open question as to whether this nonlinear effect is simply
reflective of generational or cohort differences within Krettenauer et al.’s (2016) large
age-range. Nonetheless, cross-context differentiation of values appears from middle
childhood to adolescence, but longitudinal studies should be carried out in order to better
understand when and how moral values are differentiated and integrated throughout the
lifespan from childhood to adulthood.
An important finding of the present study is that despite the differences in age as
well as in assessments of moral identity across studies (e.g., Hardy et al., 2010;
Kochanska et al., 2007; Patrick & Gibbs, 2012; Sengsavang & Krettenauer, 2015),
parental support was found to be a positive predictor of moral identity from middle
childhood to adolescence. Participants who reported higher levels of parental support had
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higher scores in mean-level of moral identity compared to participants with lower levels
of parental support. This significant effect had a small to moderate effect size (r = .21),
which suggests that although parental support had an important impact on mean-level of
moral identity, other relationship quality indicators should be considered including
friendship quality during this developmental period. Nonetheless, even with the inclusion
of relevant social contexts of family, friends, and school in present study, positive
parenting continues to play an important role in the formation of moral identity regardless
of the social context. Parents nurture their children from a young age in their homes and
hope that the values and lessons taught to their children transfer into other contexts as
well. For example, parents might model that being helpful and caring is important in the
home, which children may internalize and carry forward with their friends and peers at
school.
Several limitations of the present study should be addressed in future research. A
major limitation of the study was its cross-sectional design and limited age range.
Longitudinal models following children into adulthood would be better to disentangle the
complex (e.g., nonlinear effects) findings of moral identity development over time and
better explain individual and age-related changes with multiple time assessments.
Moreover, given the biological, social, and psychological changes inherent within this
understudied developmental period from middle childhood to adolescence (e.g.,
Schaffhuser et al., 2017), it is vital that future research designs consider how these
changes contribute to moral identity development. Given that participants were
predominately from the public school board, we were unable to adequately stratify the
sample to compare differences between the public versus catholic school system; as such
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future research should consider sampling adequately from both types of school boards to
determine the effect of the school curriculum on moral identity development. Given the
differences in the two school boards (e.g., Kelly, 2010), it is possible that the difference
in school environments may influence students’ development and behaviour. As well, the
parenting variables were based on children’s self-reports (rather than parent-reports) and
thus we need to be cautious of any causal conclusions. It is possible that there are
discrepancies between how parents view their relationship with their children and how
children view the same relationship, especially if there was any conflict between the
parent and child when the child was completing the measure which may have affected the
accuracy of the reporting. Finally, the sample of the present study was limited to a
Canadian sample of children and adolescents predominately of European descent and
although morality has universal components, there are also key cultural differences in
morality (Jia & Krettenauer, 2017). Thus it is an open question as to whether the findings
can be generalized to other cultures for this developmental period of middle childhood to
adolescence. Overall, the present study adds to the existing literature and demonstrated
that moral identity development is a lifelong process that begins prior to adolescence and
that social contexts play an important role in its development.

CHAPTER II: The Development of Moral Identity Motivation and its Links to
Moral Behaviour and Parent-Child Relationship Quality
The complex system of moral identity with self-defining moral values that
regulate behaviour cannot be fully explained by the self-importance of these values (layer
one of McAdams’ (2009) theory of personality: traits). From a social-cognitive and
characteristic adaptations approach (layer two of personality), moral identity entails the
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motivational and social-cognitive features of personality, which are more contextspecific. Therefore, beyond the trait layer of personality, moral identity is also
represented by different moral motivations and goal orientations expressed in various
areas of life. Moral motivation can be understood as an expression of moral identity that
is defined by each person (Doering, 2013). In moral psychology, moral motivation has
been broadly defined as “an agent’s willingness to do what s/he judges to be right, even if
that entails personal costs” (Nunner-Winkler, 2007, p. 402). As such, moral motivation’s
cognitive component requires the person to understand the validity of moral rules, while
also accepting it as personally binding (Blasi, 2004).
Moral motivation is multifaceted (see Krettenauer & Victor, 2017) as it entails
both motives for actions and motivation for prioritizing moral concerns over personal or
conventional concerns. Importantly, moral identity motivation is “an individual’s
motivation to uphold moral intentions in the face of other, potentially conflicting,
concerns…[and] is not limited to overt moral action but includes many aspects of
decision-making and judgment formation” (Krettenauer & Victor, 2017, p. 1). Moral
identity motivation or the reason why a moral value is important to an individual may
substantially vary from person to person, as well as from one social context to another.
For instance, being honest may be an important moral value to most individuals, but the
strength of people’s moral motivation to adhere to this moral value in real life may differ.
For one person, it is important for them to be honest at school/work because they want to
avoid punishment (external), whereas at home with family being honest makes them feel
good (internal). Therefore, when an individual recognizes and acknowledges that a
specific moral value is personally valid and important to their sense of self and do not
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want to betray the self, morality is internally motivated (cf. Blasi, 2005). Consequently,
one feels satisfied for doing what they consider is right.
Developmental psychology has historically studied different forms of internal or
autonomous motivation. According to various models of identity development, there is an
overall developmental trend toward higher levels of self-integration or internal
motivation given that one’s commitment to life goals and ideals become increasingly
self-selected and less externally imposed by others (e.g., Blasi & Glodis, 1995; Marcia,
Waterman, Matteson, Archer, & Orlofsky, 1993). According to Self-Determination
Theory (for an overview, see Ryan & Deci, 2012), rules, values, and cultural practices
can be integrated into the self to varying degrees and can be viewed as a continuum based
on the degree to which the motivation appears to be controlled or autonomous with
extrinsic motivation on one end and intrinsic motivation on the other. External or
extrinsic motivation are based on external standards set by others, whereas internal or
intrinsic motivation derive freely from the individual and are inherently worthwhile. The
continuum of extrinsic motivation has different levels of self-regulation from the least
autonomous to the most autonomous as individuals integrate social or cultural
expectations to varying degrees: external, introjected (“should do”), identified (“want to
do”), and integrated (regulations are fully assimilated with self). When values have
personal meaning and integrated within one’s sense of self, the resulting behaviour will
be self-regulated or self-chosen and thus internally initiated and autonomously driven.
The development of internal motivation is contingent on environmental factors that
support internal self-regulation (Grolnick, Deci, & Ryan, 1997). More specifically,
children require environments with autonomy support, structure, and involvement in
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order for their needs of competence and autonomy to be met and thus better promote
internalization and integration. Internal motivation is flexible and context-dependent
wherein it may decline over time with more extrinsic contingencies in a given social
context (e.g., school), but may also increase in other contexts (e.g., family) (e.g., RenaudDubé, Taylor, Lekes, Koestner, & Guay, 2010). Thus, it is vital that research considers
various contexts when measuring motivation.
Developmental trends in moral motivation have been traditionally studied in
adolescence with internal moral motivation increasing with age (e.g., Arnold, 1993) and
external moral motivation declining throughout adolescence (e.g., Krettenauer, 2011).
This trend is consistent with research on adolescents’ prosocial moral reasoning (e.g.,
Eisenberg, Zhou, & Koller, 2001; Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007), as well as
research on adolescents’ moral disengagement (Paciello, Fida, Tramontano, Lupinetti, &
Carprara, 2008). Although Krettenauer (2011) found decreases in external moral
motivation, internal moral motivation was unrelated to age in his adolescent sample. On
the other hand, more recently, Krettenauer and Victor (2017) found important contextdifferentiation in moral identity motivation in their cross-sectional study such that what
motivates individuals to behave morally may be dependent on the social context.
Specifically, they found that internal moral identity motivation was highest in the
contexts of family and community (compared to the context of school/work) whereas
external moral identity motivation was highest in the context of school/work (compared
to the contexts of family and community). Moreover, their study revealed age-related
increases in internal moral identity motivation between adolescence and young adulthood
(plateauing at middle age), while external moral identity motivation decreased with age.
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The discrepant findings from Krettenauer (2011) and Krettenauer and Victor (2017)
might be due to measurement differences in assessing moral motivation (ratings of
reasons why it is important to act morally on a 5-point scale versus openly asking
participants for reasons why self-selected moral values are extremely important to them).
Thus, increases in internal moral motivation may occur earlier in development than
adolescence – a period that has been arguably the crucial age period for the development
of moral identity.
Traditionally, morality in childhood, such as prioritizing a moral desire over an
immoral desire, is often viewed as more driven by external factors rather than emanating
from the self (Hardy & Carlo, 2011a). In particular, Kohlberg’s stage model of moral
development suggests that there is a decline in external moral motivation as adolescents
progress beyond the preconventional stages (Stages 1 and 2) and move onto the
conventional stages (Stages 3 and 4) where one’s own conscience becomes more salient
(see Gibbs et al., 2007).4 At the same time, according to three contemporary, prominent
lines of research (i.e., social domain theory, infants’ helping behaviour, and development
of children’s empathy) (for an overview, see Sengsavang, Willemsen, & Krettenauer,
2015), children spontaneously engage in prosocial moral actions because they genuinely
care about the wellbeing of others and they believe it is the right thing to do regardless of
instrumental rewards. These contemporary lines of research are in contrast to what Piaget
(1932/1999) and Kohlberg (1976) would have stressed.

4

Kohlberg’s (1976) preconventional stages are based on obedience and punishment, as well as
instrumentalism or “what’s in it for me?”, whereas his conventional stages focus on good interpersonal
relationships or “good boy/nice girl” and maintaining social conventions.
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Moral motivation in childhood has been mostly inferred from rule justifications or
decision-making in hypothetical dilemma situations, but when examining explicit moral
motives of everyday moral actions, Sengsavang et al. (2015) found that overall internal
moral motivation (i.e., fairness-related, personal-moral preferences) increased, which
indicates higher levels of organismic integration as described by Self-Determination
Theory (for an overview, see Deci & Ryan, 2012). On the other hand, external motives
(i.e., self-interested, standards and rules) decreased among children aged 4- to 12-years,
but continued to be salient among 10- to 12-year-olds in the antisocial context (i.e.,
harming others). The findings from Sengsavang et al. (2015) and Krettenauer and Victor
(2017) seem to support Self-Determination Theory that proposes developmental
processes move towards internal modes of self-regulation (e.g., Grolnick et al., 1997), but
are also flexible and context-dependent (see Ryan & Deci, 2008). Evidently, it is
important that future research expands the age range to include both children and
adolescents to better understand how context plays a role in the development of moral
motivation.
Research in moral development has consistently demonstrated the important role
the family has on children’s moral development (for an overview, see Sengsavang &
Krettenauer, in press). The family environment, specifically parental behaviours or
parent-child relationships, can profoundly influence the importance of morality to the self
(Hardy et al., 2010). According to Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological systems theory,
one’s sense of identity is a result of their interactions with people in their lives, especially
their family and friends. Importantly, Bronfenbrenner stressed that interactions within the
most personal ecosystem, the microsystem, are typically bidirectional such that personal
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relationships one has with family members, friends, peers, and teachers influence one’s
development but at the same time, how one reacts to or interacts with these individuals
also influences how individuals treat the person in return. Arguably, the family
environment influences their child’s morality through the broader quality of the parentchild relationship consisting of behavioural compliance within the network of good,
positive relations that they share (Sengsavang & Krettenauer, in press; Thompson et al.,
2006). Therefore, warm, nurturing and supportive interactions between the parent and
child likely fosters a healthier development. For example, supportive and warm parenting
– which is theoretically related to secure attachment – has been positively linked to the
development of moral reasoning (e.g., Malti, Eisenberg, Kim, & Buchmann, 2013; Pratt,
Skoe, & Arnold, 2004), moral motivation (Malti & Buchmann, 2010; Sengsavang et al.,
2015), and prosocial behaviours (e.g., Carlo, Mestre, Samper, Tur, & Armenta, 2011).
More specifically, children reporting warm and supportive parent-child relationships as
well as fewer negative interactions with their parents were more likely to elucidate their
motives for moral action and were more other-oriented in their motivations compared to
children with more negative parent-child relationships (Sengsavang et al., 2015).
The present study was designed to address the gaps in the moral motivation
literature as a way to better understand the development of moral identity at the second
layer of McAdams’ (2009) personality theory. In particular, we wanted to elucidate these
findings pertaining to moral identity motivation by exploring age-related differences in
moral identity motivation while considering context-specificity most relevant to this age
period (i.e., family, friends, and school), as well as how moral identity motivation relates
to parent-child relationship quality and teacher-reported moral behaviour. Moral
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motivation and moral behaviour are intimately connected from a theoretical perspective,
but only a few studies have empirically examined this relation (Malti, Gummerum, &
Buchmann, 2007; Malti, Gummerum, Keller, & Buchmann, 2009). Following the
existing research, it was reasonable to expect that moral identity motivation would be
context-specific such that higher levels of internal moral identity motivation was
expected in contexts of family and friends given that morality is more central to
individuals in these contexts, while external motivation was expected to be highest in the
context of school. As well, similar to previous research, age-related increases in internal
moral identity motivation and decreases in external moral identity motivation were
expected during this period from middle childhood to adolescence. Finally, higher levels
of internal moral identity motivation were expected to be related to more positive parentchild relationship quality and higher levels of teacher-reported moral behaviour across
middle childhood to adolescence.
Method
Sample and Procedure
The sample was the same as Chapter I with 190 participants (101 females)
approximately evenly distributed across three different age groups. For more details on
the sample description, recruitment and overall procedure, see Chapter I and Table 1 for
summary of all demographic variables by age group. This study included a mixedmethod cross-sectional design with 45-minute semi-structured interviews and a 15minute self-report questionnaire. The interview was conducted to assess participants’
moral identity in three different contexts (family, friends, and school) and the
questionnaire was used to assess parent-child relationship quality and social desirability
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response bias. Teachers also completed a short questionnaire on their student’s social
behaviour. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. This study was
part of a larger mixed-method cross-sectional and multi-informant study; thus, only
procedures and measures relevant to the present study are discussed. Two interviews
were unscorable due to equipment failure, resulting in this Chapter’s sample to be N =
188. These two participants were males from the early adolescent age group and
identified themselves as Canadian of European descent. With the exclusion of these two
participants, the sample demographics remained the same given that: age group was still
unrelated to gender (c2 (2, N = 188) = 2.98, p = .23) and ethnic background (c2 (2, N =
185) = 4.43, p = .11), while gender was still unrelated to ethnic background (c2 (1, N =
185) = 0.56, p = .46), and finally age group continued to differ with regard to SES (F(2,
183) = 6.42, p = .002). Post-hoc tests (Scheffé’s; p < .05) revealed that the youngest age
group (middle childhood) still have significantly lower SES than the two older age
groups (early adolescence and mid-adolescence). Therefore, there were no differences in
the sample when excluding the two interviews that were unscorable. See Table 3 for an
updated summary of all demographic variables by age group.
Moral Identity Interview
The Moral Identity Interview followed the same procedure developed by
Krettenauer et al. (2016) and Krettenauer and Victor (2017) based on the widely
validated Good Self-Assessment (Arnold, 1993) to measure moral identity and moral
identity motivation. The procedure was slightly modified for the present study’s younger
sample of children and adolescents (for details, see Chapter I). The interview first began
with the ratings of the self-importance of moral values, for more details on this portion of
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the interview, see Chapter I. After participants completed rating the self-importance of
moral values for each diagram representing a social context, similar to previous research
with participants in middle childhood (Sengsavang et al., 2015), participants were further
asked to explain their reasoning. In particular, participants were asked to elaborate on the
moral values or qualities they placed in the inner most circle of the diagram indicating
that it was “extremely important to me”. For example, “you put being honest, caring, and
respectful at the center of the diagram and these qualities are extremely important to you.
How come these qualities are extremely important to you in the context of your family?’.
Moral identity motivation. Coding categories were deductively informed from
past research examining moral motivation (Krettenauer & Victor, 2017; Sengsavang et
al., 2015). Coding categories were defined to capture common themes of moral identity
motivation on a continuum from external to internal motivation as described by SelfDetermination Theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000). The following nine coding categories
derived from Krettenauer and Victor (2017) (adolescents and adults) as well as
Sengsavang et al. (2015) (middle childhood) were used as a framework for the present
study: (1) standards and rules, (2) self-interest, (3) reputation, (4) consequencesrelationships, (5) consequences-others, (6) fairness-related, (7) relationship ideals, (8)
role model, and (9) self ideals. These coding categories were chosen for the framework to
best reflect individuals’ motivation to maintain their moral identity as well as were most
suitable for the age range of the sample given that no single study has examined explicit
moral motivation with children and adolescents. Thus, we examined coding categories
from Sengsavang et al.’s (2015) study with participants in middle childhood and
Krettenauer and Victor’s (2017) study with participants in adolescence and adulthood to
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account for motivations across middle childhood and adolescence. Similar to the
aforementioned studies, if a participant articulated more than one motive, all motives
were coded separately. Thus, multiple responses were possible for each context. For a
detailed description of these categories as well as interview examples, see Table 4.
A subset of 47 transcripts (25% of total sample) was randomly selected across the
age groups and periods of the data collection to determine agreement between two
independent coders. For the family context, inter-coder agreement was κ = .72; for the
context of friends, it was κ = .74; and for the context of school, it was κ = .73.
Discrepancies between coders were discussed until consensus was reached. Establishing
inter-coder agreement took approximately one month (August 28, 2017 to October 2,
2017) and then one coder completed coding the remaining transcripts (n = 141) within 15
days following establishing inter-coder reliability. For the nine coding categories
combined across all contexts, the relative frequencies ranged from 2.96% to 20.89% (see
Table 4).
Following Krettenauer and Victor (2017), these coding categories were grouped
into three category groups to represent moral identity motivation: external, internal, and
relationship-oriented (see Table 4). Standards and rules, self-interest, and reputation
were combined to represent external moral identity motivation given their focus on
standards and consequences of moral actions that are external to the self. In contrast,
consequences-others, fairness-related, relationship ideals, role model, and self ideals
represented internal moral identity motivation as they express connection to moral values.
Consequences-relationship can be interpreted as either internal or external motivation
and cannot be differentiated between these two types of motivation given that it focuses
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on a concern for consequences of moral actions on their relationships. As such, this
coding category was kept as a separate category group labelled relationship-oriented
moral identity motivation. The three category groups of moral identity motivation were
used in the main analyses and scores for each category group were calculated by totalling
the coding categories (e.g., standards and rules, self-interest, and reputation) pertaining to
each category group (e.g., external). These calculations were computed separately for the
three social contexts (family, friends, and school). It is important to note that given that
multiple responses were possible in each context, as well as both internal and external
moral identity motivation category groups encompassed multiple coding categories (e.g.,
family: self-interest (external), role model (internal), relationship ideal (internal); friends:
reputation (external), standards and rules (external), consequences-others (internal)), the
sum score was open-ended and had no defined maximum.
Table 5 displays the descriptive statistics for the category groups and the scores
indicate the number of times a particular type of moral identity motivation (external,
internal, or relationship-oriented) was present in a given social context by participants.
The numerical value of 0 indicates that in a given context, there was no response in any
of the coding categories of that specific category group for that particular participant. On
the other hand, a numerical value of 2 indicates that a participant’s responses fit into two
coding categories from the same category group in a given context (e.g., role model and
relationship ideal for internal moral identity motivation in the context of family). It is
important to note that scores for one category group do not affect scores in another
category group given that the numerical values are analytically independent. Despite
analytical independence, the moral identity motivation category groups were empirically
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correlated (see Table 6). Consistent with Krettenauer and Victor (2017) and SelfDetermination Theory, bivariate correlations between external and internal motivation
were significantly negative in all three contexts, whereas consistencies across contexts
were small to moderate, with a median bivariate correlation of r = .26.
Questionnaire Measures
Moral behaviour. Teachers were asked to complete a short questionnaire for
each participant regarding their moral behaviour, specifically the two dimensions of
prosocial and antisocial behaviours. This short questionnaire was comprised of a
combination of two previously validated scales. First, the revised Child Behavior Scale
(CBS; Ladd & Profilet, 1996) from Vandell et al. (2006) that included 17 items to form
two scales, Aggressive with Peers (nine-items; e.g., “Taunts and teases other students”,
“Argues with students”; α = .92) and Prosocial with Peers (eight-items; e.g., “Is kind
towards students”, “Offers help or comfort when other students are upset”; α = .92).
Secondly, 10 items from the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman,
1997) was used: five items from the Prosocial scale (e.g., “Considerate of other people’s
feelings”, “Shares readily with other students”; α = .87) and five-items from the Conduct
Problems scale (e.g., “Often loses temper”, “Often fights with other students or bullies
them”; α = .80). Teachers responded to each item on a 3-point scale, 0 = not true, 1 =
somewhat true, and 2 = certainly true.
In the present study, correlational analyses indicated significantly strong positive
associations between the CBS and SDQ measures for prosocial items (r(187) = .90, p <
.001) and between the antisocial items (r(187) = .88, p < .001). Subsequently, the two
measures were combined to create two subscales to represent moral behaviour: prosocial
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behaviour (13 items; eight items from the CBS and five items from the SDQ) and
antisocial behaviour (14 items; nine items from the CBS and five items from the SDQ).
An average score was computed for each subscale with higher scores representing either
higher levels of prosocial behaviour or antisocial behaviour. For the complete scale, see
Appendix C. Internal consistencies were high for both overall prosocial and antisocial
behaviours, α = .95 and α = .94 respectively. Similar to previous studies (e.g., Hardy,
Bean, & Olsen, 2015; Vandell et al., 2006), sample mean for prosocial behaviour (M =
1.61, SD = .43) was higher than for antisocial behaviour (M = .20, SD = .37).
Parent-child relationship quality. For details on this measure, see Chapter I.
Social desirability. For details on this measure, see Chapter I.
Results
Preliminary analyses were conducted to identify if self-importance of moral
values, gender, social desirability, ethnicity, and/or SES were to be included as control
variables in the main analyses (see Table 7). All bivariate correlations between study
variables can be found in Table 8. Tests of normality indicated some measures were
positively skewed, but most assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity
were met. The parametric tests used below have also been demonstrated to be robust to
violations of normality (e.g., Blanca, Alarcón, Arnau, Bono, & Bendayan, 2017; Rasch &
Guiard, 2004).
For moral identity motivation category groups, self-importance of moral values,
gender, social desirability, ethnicity, and SES were unrelated to moral identity
motivation. As such, no control variables were used in the main analyses involving moral
identity motivation.
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For moral behaviour, SES was significantly related to antisocial behaviour and
gender was significantly related to both types of moral behaviours. Females had higher
scores in prosocial behaviour than males, whereas males had higher scores in aggression
compared to females. The self-importance of moral values, social desirability, and
ethnicity, by contrast, were unrelated to moral behaviour. Both SES and gender were
used as control variables in the main analyses predicting moral behaviour.
Moral Identity Motivation and Age
Similar to previous research (Krettenauer & Victor, 2017; Sengsavang et al.,
2015), in order to investigate age-related differences in moral identity motivation across
social contexts, a mixed model multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was
conducted with repeated measures of moral identity motivation (external, relationshiporiented, internal) in three social contexts (family, friends, school), as well as the three
age groups (middle childhood, early adolescence, mid-adolescence) as between-subjects
factor. For bivariate correlations between age and all motivation coding categories, see
Table 9. This MANOVA procedure yielded a significant main effect of motivation (see
Table 10). However, this main effect was qualified by two significant Two-Way
interactions: (a) an interaction between moral identity motivation and age group and (b)
an interaction between moral identity motivation and social contexts. Thus, participants’
moral identity motivation varied by age as well as by social contexts (family, friends,
school).5

5

Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the main effect of motivation,
c2 (2) = 45.22, p < .001, and the interaction between motivation and social contexts, c2 (9) = 61.68, p <
.001. Greenhouse-Geisser corrected tests (∈ = .82, .86 respectively) yielded slightly different degrees of
freedom and F-values, but all p-values remained the same at p < .001.
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Differences between age groups for moral identity motivation (averaged across
contexts) were followed up by univariate ANOVAs and post-hoc tests (Scheffé; p < .05).
For external moral identity motivation, significant differences were found between age
groups, F(2, 184) = 6.01, p = .003, h2p = .06 (see Table 11). Participants in middle
childhood scored the highest in external moral identity motivation and significantly
differed from participants in mid-adolescence (p = .008, CI[.01, .12], d = .62), who
scored the lowest. Moreover, participants in early adolescence and mid-adolescence
significantly differed from each other (p = .015, CI[.01, .12], d = .53) with the oldest age
group scoring the lowest in external moral identity motivation. As such, it seems that
external moral identity motivation decreases with age. For the sum of responses for
external moral identity motivation category groups by age group, see Figure 2.
For relationship-oriented moral identity motivation, significant differences
between age groups emerged, F(2, 184) = 10.00, p < .001, h2p = .10 (see Table 11).
Participants in middle childhood scored the highest in relationship-oriented motivation
and significantly differed from the oldest age group as mid-adolescents scored the lowest
(p < .001, CI[.11, .37], d = .77). Participants in middle childhood and early adolescence
were marginally different from each other (p = .054, CI[-.00, .25], d = .43), with the
youngest age group scoring higher in relationship-oriented moral identity motivation. It
appears that relationship-oriented moral identity motivation decreases with age.
For internal moral identity motivation, again, significant differences between age
groups were found, F(2, 184) = 14.21, p < .001, h2p = .13 (see Table 11). The youngest
age group scored the lowest in internal moral identity motivation and marginally differed
from participants in early adolescence (p = .082, CI[-.08, .00], d = .40). The oldest age
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group scored significantly higher than participants in both middle childhood (p < .001,
CI[.05, .14], d = .98) as well as participants in early adolescence (p = .008, CI[.01, .10], d
= .56). Evidently, internal moral identity motivation appears to increase with age. For the
sum of responses for internal moral identity motivation category groups by age group, see
Figure 3.
Mean differences of moral identity motivation by context are summarized in
Table 5. Internal moral identity motivation was most salient in the family and friends
contexts, whereas both external and internal moral identity motivation were salient in the
school context. In terms of moral identity motivation, pairwise comparisons with a
Bonferroni correction showed that external moral identity motivation in the school
context was significantly higher than both the family context, p < .001, CI[.26, .49], d =
.65, and the friends context, p < .001, CI[.46, .72], d = 1.13; external moral identity
motivation in the family context was significantly higher than in the friends context, p <
.001, CI[.12, .32], d = .47. Relationship-oriented moral identity motivation in the friends
context was significantly higher than the family context, p = .004, CI[.04, .27], d = .31
and the school context, p < .001, CI[.32, .50], d = 94; relationship-oriented moral identity
motivation in the family context was significantly higher than in the school context, p <
.001, CI[.16, .35], d = .59. Thus, participants reported the highest levels of external moral
identity motivation in the school context compared to the other contexts and the highest
levels of relationship-oriented moral identity motivation in first the friends context
followed by the family context.
In terms of context, pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction showed
that in the family context, internal moral identity motivation was significantly higher than
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both external moral identity motivation, p < .001, CI[.33, .70], d = .81, and relationshiporiented moral identity motivation, p < .001, CI[.33, .67], d = .80. In the friends context,
internal moral identity motivation was significantly higher than both external moral
identity motivation, p < .001, CI[.58, .91], d = 1.25, and relationship-oriented moral
identity motivation, p < .001, CI[.16, .55], d = .57, while relationship-oriented motivation
was significantly higher than external motivation, p < .001, CI[.27, .51], d = .88. Finally,
in the school context, relationship-oriented moral identity motivation was significantly
lower than both external motivation, p < .001, CI[-.74, -.48], d = 1.19, and internal
motivation, p < .001, CI[-.79, -.47], d = 1.06. Thus, within the family and friends context,
only internal moral identity motivation was referred to most, whereas in the school
context, both internal and external moral identity motivation were more salient.
Effects of Parent-Child Relationship Quality
To investigate the effect of parent-child relationship quality (parental support,
parent-child negative interaction) on moral identity motivation, multiple regression
analyses were performed separately for each moral identity motivation category group
combined across the social contexts (external, relationship-oriented, internal). Parental
support and parent-child negative interaction were entered in Step 1 followed by SES as
the control variable in Step 2. Findings from these regressions are summarized in Table
12. Parental support and parent-child negative interaction were not significant predictors
in any of the moral identity motivation category groups.
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Moral Identity Motivation and Moral Behaviour
To examine how moral identity motivation predicts moral behaviour, multiple
regressions were performed separately for each type of moral behaviour (prosocial and
antisocial). First, moral identity motivation (external, relationship-oriented, internal) was
entered in Step 1, followed by SES and gender as control variables entered in Step 2.
Findings from these regressions are summarized in Table 13. Internal moral identity
motivation was a significant negative predictor of antisocial behaviour (β = -.19, p =
.030, B = -.65, 95% CI [-.1.24, -.06], ΔR2 = .07) above and beyond SES and gender.
Relationship-oriented moral identity motivation was a marginally significant positive
predictor of antisocial behaviour (β = .13, p = .095, B = .16, 95% CI [-.03, .34], ΔR2 =
.07). By contrast, external moral identity motivation was unrelated to both types of moral
behaviour.
Discussion
The present study was designed to examine age-related differences in moral
identity motivation across middle childhood and adolescence to better understand the
development of moral identity at the second layer of McAdams’ (2009) personality
theory. As expected, it was found that moral identity motivation varied by both age and
social contexts most relevant to this age period (family, friends, school). First, both
external and relationship-oriented moral identity motivation decreased with age, while
internal moral identity motivation increased with age. Moral identity motivation was
context-specific such that levels of internal, external, and relationship-oriented moral
identity motivation differed depending on whether the context was family, friends, or
school. Finally, moral identity motivation was unrelated to parent-child relationship
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quality, and there was a negative relationship between internal moral identity motivation
and antisocial behaviour. In the following, these findings and their implications are
discussed in detail.
Similar to previous research, the overall age-related trends of moral identity
motivation are consistent with Self-Determination Theory such that there appears to be a
developmental trend towards higher levels of self-integration or internal motivation from
middle childhood to adolescence. Moreover, moral identity motivation is indeed flexible
and context-dependent as previous research suggests, given the present study’s finding of
differential patterns of motivation in the three contexts of family, friends, and school.
Extending and replicating Renaud-Dubé et al.’s (2010) research on autonomous
environmental motivation and Krettenauer and Victor’s (2017) research on moral identity
motivation, increases in internal moral identity motivation occurs prior to adolescence
and is most salient in contexts of family and friends, while external moral identity
motivation was highest in the school context compared to the other two contexts. The
study’s findings were statistically significant, but they also have important practical
significance given that nine percent of the variance was accounted for by the age and
motivation interaction, while 53 percent of the variance was accounted for by the context
and motivation interaction. Therefore, while motivation importantly varies by age and
context (all effect sizes of Cohen’s d were medium to large), social contexts especially
impacts an individual’s moral identity motivation. Theoretically, this confirms the
developmental nature of moral identity motivation that moves towards more internal
modes of self-regulation and integration, but age is not the only factor that is impacting
its development. Practically, this means that with age, moral identity motivation becomes
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more internal overall but interventions aimed to promote moral behaviour and moral
motivation should especially consider how the social contexts can influence one’s
motivations and thus moral behaviour. In particular, educators need to be cognizant of
promoting more internal modes of motivation in the school environment given that
internal motivation has been a stronger predictor of various actual behaviour—including
moral behaviour as the present study demonstrated—than external motivation (for an
overview, see Deci & Ryan, 2012).
Krettenauer and Victor (2017) did not find age-related differences in relationshiporiented moral identity motivation across adolescence to adulthood, whereas the present
study found a decrease in this type of motivation from middle childhood to adolescence.
The difference in these findings is likely due to the different developmental periods under
study. Given the younger sample of the present study, it was unsurprising that
relationship-oriented moral identity motivation was highest in the friends context given
that peer relationships tend to increase in importance and intimacy during middle
childhood and adolescence, but especially in middle childhood when social hierarchies of
power and popularity are most salient (for an overview, see Parker, Rubin, Erath,
Wojslawowicz, & Buskirk, 2006). It is probable that moral identity motivation in the
friends context is less stable over time compared to the family and school (which would
later be work) contexts given that the importance of friends is most significant during
childhood and adolescence, whereas other relationships such as romantic relationships
become increasingly important in adulthood. For example, moral identity motivation
might fluctuate from external to relationship-oriented to internal within the friends
context overtime, but individuals also develop new friendships or have the same long
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lasting friendships across the lifespan and thus motivations may or may not fluctuate.
Overall, like previous research suggests, as individuals transition from middle childhood
to adolescence, it appears that their commitment to goals and ideals become increasingly
self-chosen, less externally imposed by others, and less grounded on relationship
concerns as reflected in the current sample’s increase in internal motivation and decrease
in both external and relationship-oriented moral identity motivation.
Contrary to our expectation, we did not find any significant relationships between
moral identity motivation and parent-child relationship quality. This was the first study to
examine the role of parenting on moral identity motivation (i.e., motives for the selfimportance of moral values), whereas previous studies on parenting and moral motivation
examined moral motivation generally through hypothetical moral dilemmas (Malti &
Buchmann, 2010) and explicit motives for engaging in prosocial behaviour and avoiding
antisocial behaviour (Sengsavang et al., 2015). Moreover, in Malti and Buchmann (2010)
the quality of parent-child relationship quality amongst 15-year-olds and 21-year-olds
was a combination of self-ratings and primary-caregiver ratings of the same items rather
than only derived from self-reports. Thus, the lack of findings in the present study could
be attributable to measurement differences. Unlike Malti and Buchmann (2010), this
study also did not take into account the effect of friendship quality on moral identity
motivation nor did either study examine teacher-student relationship quality, which may
be important contributors to moral identity motivation during this period. From a
developmental perspective, this transition period from middle childhood and adolescence
may encompass other important relationships (e.g., teachers, coaches, siblings) that are
more influential to an individual’s moral identity motivation compared to the parent-child
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relationship. Finally, the role of parent-child relationship quality on moral identity
motivation might be more important for females than for males. Past research has
documented gender differences in moral motivation (e.g., Malti & Buchmann, 2010;
Malti et al., 2009; Nunner-Winkler, Meyer-Nikele, & Wohlrab, 2007), and although the
present study did not find any gender differences in moral motivation, follow-up analyses
indicated that parental support positively predicted internal moral identity motivation for
females (b = .25, p < .05), but not for males. Perhaps other relationships are more
important in shaping male’s moral identity motivation during this sensitive period
between middle childhood and adolescence. Evidently, further research on how gender,
parent-child relationship, as well as friendship and teacher-student relationship quality
affects moral identity motivation is needed.
Despite the theoretical connection between moral motivation and moral
behaviour, few empirical studies have examined this relation. The present study adds to
the limited literature by examining type of motivation (rather than overall moral
motivation) and prosocial and antisocial behaviour (rather than only prosocial behaviour).
As hypothesized, above and beyond gender and parental SES, internal moral identity
motivation was a negative predictor of antisocial behaviour, while relationship-oriented
moral identity motivation positively predicted antisocial behaviour. In line with past
research that has demonstrated internal motivation as a stronger predictor of behaviour
compared to external motivation in areas of prosocial behaviour, health behaviour, and
academic behaviours (for an overview, see Deci & Ryan, 2012), external moral identity
motivation was not a significant predictor of moral behaviour, whereas internal moral
identity motivation was predictive of antisocial behaviour. This finding was statistically
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significant, but also suggests practical significance with its moderate effect size (r = -.29)
and thus interventions aimed to promote moral behaviour need to strongly consider
internal moral motivation as a means to less antisocial behaviour. Evidently, internal
moral motivation reflects a desire to care for others and identification with moral values
as part of oneself, which may strengthen one’s overall motivation to behave less
antisocially—as reflected in our findings.
On the other hand, relationship-oriented moral identity motivation is driven by
consequences on one’s relationships which are very important during this developmental
age period and thus might be more similar to external motivation than internal motivation
given the focus on consequences. In fact, as seen in Table 6, relationship-oriented moral
identity motivation was significantly and negatively related to internal moral identity
motivation for each context (rs ranged from -.16 to -.49, ps < .05) and across contexts
(r(186) = -.39, p < .001). Therefore, it is not surprising that internal and relationshiporiented moral identity motivation both predict antisocial behaviour, albeit in opposite
ways. In order for children to become moral citizens of the future, it is vital for parents
and educators to cultivate environments promoting and attracting children’s internal
motivation as a means to encourage moral behaviour – especially given the practical
significance of how context interacts with motivation. For example, teachers involved in
the Child Development Project (CDP; see Battistich, Schaps, & Wilson, 2004), which
was designed to promote caring learners and prosocial character, helped develop
students’ intrinsic motivations to act cooperatively by engaging them in rule-setting,
decision-making, and problem-solving. By offering environments focused on
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rewards/punishments to the self and to their relationships (relationship-oriented), children
are less likely to be prosocial and more likely to engage in antisocial behaviours.
This study was not without limitations. The main limitations were discussed in
Chapter I (i.e., cross-sectional design, limited age-range, public versus catholic school
boards, self-reports of parent-child relationship quality, and sample was predominately of
European descent), but there are some specific limitations related to the present study.
First, moral behaviour was assessed by teacher-reports, but there may be differences in
the degree to which elementary school teachers and high school teachers engage with
their students. More specifically, high school students have several teachers throughout
the day, whereas elementary school students spend much more time with their homeroom
teacher. In similar vein, background demographics of teachers (e.g., years of experience)
were not collected, which has implications for how well they may engage or know how to
evaluate students’ social behaviours. Teachers with less experience may not adequately
or confidently know how to assess students’ social behaviours compared to teachers with
many years of experience and thus the assessments of moral behaviour in the present
study may not accurately represent participants’ actual moral behaviour. Future research
ought to collect demographic information on teachers as well as assess high school
students’ moral behaviour through reports from multiple teachers rather than only one to
provide a more accurate assessment of behaviour. Finally, given that aspects of morality
appears to be context-dependent, moral behaviour may also vary from context to context
and the present study only measured moral behaviour in one context (school). Thus,
future research may aim to measure moral behaviour in different contexts (family,
friends) to examine if one’s moral actions differ depending on the social context and who
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is assessing the behaviour (e.g., parent, teacher, peers). It is possible that moral identity
motivation is more predictive of moral behaviour in some contexts (e.g., family and
friends) than others (e.g., school, community), which may also change over time.
Overall, the present study adds an important contribution to the literature by
examining moral identity motivation from middle childhood to adolescence. In particular,
moral identity motivation differs depending on the social context and its development is
not limited to adolescence and beyond. The present study provides evidence that moral
identity motivation can be studied with younger samples by using an open-ended
qualitative approach to understanding children’s and adolescent’s motivations that indeed
vary from context to context. Evidently, it is imperative that developmental research and
theory on moral identity motivation consider both age and social contexts, especially
given that its development appears to be more complex than simply stating that internal
motivation increases and external motivation decreases with age. Overall, by providing
environments (especially the school environment) that attract and promote internal
motivation and self-regulation while children age, we are more likely to cultivate moral
citizens of the future. Given especially the current political climate and thus the
continuous aspiration for moral citizens, moral identity motivation should continue to be
studied as well as encouraged and discussed by parents and educators as an important
goal of moral development to better foster engagement in moral actions among children
and students.
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CHAPTER III: Moral Identity Development through Reflections on Past (Im)Moral
Experiences
In recent years, narrative approaches have become more popular as a means to
understanding personality – including aspects of moral identity – by examining
integrative life narratives or the life story, which is the third layer of McAdams’ (2009)
three-layer model of personality. Beyond the trait layer (first layer) and characteristic
adaptations layer (second layer) of personality, moral identity is also reflected in the life
stories individuals tell. According to Erikson (1959/1980), an individual’s identity affords
a sense of stability or connection over time as they integrate their past experiences with
present concerns and future plans and goals. This notion best elucidates this third layer of
personality and specifically, moral identity, by highlighting the important role of an
individual’s life story or past life narratives in shaping one’s identity (see also McAdams,
2001; McLean & Pasupathi, 2012).
Narratives about past experiences and events – and thus the interpretation and
construction of these narratives – can typically be seen to either confirm one’s self-view
or challenge it (for a review, see Pasupathi, Mansour, & Brubaker, 2007). At the same
time, narrative research has also revealed that lessons learned (i.e., change in behaviour
caused by past event) and gaining insight (i.e., change in one’s self-understanding or selfview beyond the past event itself) are two types of meaning making that individuals have
when reflecting on past experiences (see McLean 2005; McLean & Thorne, 2003). This
ability to form self-event connections or connecting past experiences or actions to the
present self is an important aspect of identity development (e.g., Krettenauer & Mosleh,
2013; McLean & Pasupathi, 2012; McLean & Pratt, 2006). Overall, self-event
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connections in one’s narratives about past events appears to increase with age from early
adulthood to young adulthood (Pasupathi & Mansour, 2006). This mechanism of identity
development has also been empirically applied to moral identity development,
specifically how individuals connect narratives about past moral and immoral behaviours
to their present sense of self (Krettenauer & Mosleh, 2013; Recchia et al., 2015).
Developmental research suggests that the life story becomes integrated into
personality and is considered a developmental achievement that begins with the
biological, social, and cognitive transitions of adolescence (e.g., Habermas & de Silveira,
2008; Reese et al., 2014). Although life stories become more connected or reflective of
one’s sense of self during adolescence and emerging adulthood (Habermas & Bluck,
2000; Habermas & Reese, 2015), children as young as five years are able to narrate and
construct meaningful accounts of episodes or events of their lives (e.g., Fivush & Nelson,
2004; Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010b), including morally-laden experiences of helping and
harming others (e.g., Recchia et al., 2015; Recchia, Wainryb, & Pasupathi, 2013;
Wainryb & Pasupathi, 2018). Narrative accounts about children’s and adolescents’ own
past moral achievements (i.e., helping others) and failures (i.e., harming others) can aid in
understanding their own interpretations and representations of these experiences;
specifically their thoughts, emotions, and more importantly, their motivation behind these
behaviours (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010a; Recchia et al., 2015; Wainryb, Brehl, &
Matwin, 2005). At the same time, as individuals reflect on and interpret these narrative
accounts of past moral behaviour, it may “encourage and facilitates the development of a
more mature sense of how one’s morally relevant actions are based in goals and beliefs
(i.e., a sense of moral agency)” (Tappan, 2010, p. 81), while also negotiating the extent of
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their moral responsibilities (Tappan, 2010). More specifically, when an individual
reflects on the consequences of their actions (e.g., emotions evoked from the self, as well
as the emotional or behavioural response of the other person), this aids in the
development and construction of their moral self or moral identity given that it allows the
individual to understand how they want to be and who they want to be as a moral person.
Arguably, narratives reflect children’s current moral understanding, while also
prospectively shaping new understandings that cannot be captured from other approaches
such as self-report questionnaires (Wainryb & Pasupathi, 2018). During middle
childhood and adolescence, children are developing more sophisticated understandings of
themselves and others, while also becoming more skilled in reflecting on the
psychological features of their experiences (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010a; Recchia et al.,
2015). Evidently, the way they perceive and interpret past experiences may change over
time.
There have been several empirical studies examining age-related and contextdependent differences in how children and adolescents narrate past (im)moral behaviours.
For example, Recchia et al., (2015) found meaningful asymmetries in children’s and
adolescents’ past experiences of helping and harming in the context of friends, such that
reasons in the harmful context was both self- and other-focused, whereas reasons in the
helping narratives were mainly other-focused across middle childhood and adolescence.
In terms of age-related differences, Recchia et al. (2015) found that participants of all
ages highlighted the negative consequences of harming others, yet younger children were
less likely to consider the positive consequences of helping others. Proulx and Chandler
(2009) proposed a general developmental trend of adolescents’ self-views that reflect
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increased context dependency with age such that one narrates their bad behaviours as
externally motivated, while viewing their good behaviours as internally motivated. On
the other hand, Krettenauer and Mosleh (2013) found participants with higher levels of
internal motivation and older participants (adults compared to adolescents) had more selfevent connections such that they were more likely to make a connection between past
(im)moral and their present self. In the aforementioned studies, there were two moral
contexts of prosocial and antisocial behaviours, but only one social context was
investigated (Recchia et al., 2015) or social context was not examined at all (Krettenauer
& Mosleh, 2013; Proulx & Chandler, 2009).
Recchia and colleagues (2013) examined narrative accounts of harming
experiences in two social contexts (i.e., siblings and friends) and demonstrated how these
two social contexts are distinct for sociomoral development. For instance, they found
social context or relationship differences in participants’ reasons for harm such that harm
against siblings was based on emotional/impulsive reasons and provocation (i.e.,
offensive behaviour or property-related issues), whereas harm against friends was due to
relationship-oriented concerns such as trust and desire for connectedness, as well as more
benign behaviours (i.e., benevolent reasons such a prosocial intent and extenuating
circumstances). In terms of age-related differences, Recchia et al. (2013) found that 7year-olds described mutual harm more often with siblings compared to friends (though
this was not apparent among 11-year-olds or 16-year-olds), while narrative accounts of
harming siblings and friends became somewhat more similar with age (e.g., children are
increasingly able to recognize the hurtful consequences of their behaviour). Moreover,
experiences of harm became more psychologically based with age as participants
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increasingly made references to the cognition of the victim. Given the importance and
difference in social contexts (siblings versus friends), as well as the two dimensions of
moral action (harmful and helpful), it is imperative that individual differences in
children’s and adolescents’ experiences of harming and helping are investigated
separately for the friends context and the family context to further understand how
individuals differentially narrate their past (im)moral actions depending on social context
and moral context.
To date, no studies have compared these two moral contexts as well as these two
social contexts in children and adolescents. Furthermore, by using the narrative approach
to moral identity (layer three of personality) that has been used in the past, we were able
to investigate the ways in which children versus adolescents connect morally relevant
experiences to their sense of self and reveal moral motivations in their narratives. In sum,
the purpose of this study was to extend previous research by examining both types of
contexts, as well as investigating children’s and adolescents’ narrative descriptions of the
(1) type of harmful and helpful behaviours, (2) their motivations or reasons for engaging
in these behaviours, and (3) the extent to which they describe how the past morally
relevant experience connects to their present self. Based on the lack of research
examining moral contexts and social contexts in narratives, it may be premature to offer
specific hypotheses. Broadly, context was expected to impact how children and
adolescents narrate and understand their past (im)moral experiences, while the ability to
draw stronger connections between past events and the current self was expected to
increase with age. As such, the present study provided increased richness to
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understanding moral identity development by examining how children and adolescents
construe and interpret their past (im)moral experiences.
Method
Sample, Measures and Procedures
The sample was the same as Chapter II with 188 participants (101 females) given
that two interviews from the original N = 190 (Chapter I) were unscorable, for more
details on the sample and recruitment, see Chapters I and II, as well as Table 3 for a
summary of all demographic variables by age group. The present study included a mixedmethod cross-sectional design with a 45-minute semi-structured interviews and a 15minute self-report questionnaire. This study was part of a larger mixed-method crosssectional and multi-informant study (Chapters I and II) and thus only procedures and
measures relevant to the present study are discussed.
Children and adolescents were interviewed individually in a private room at the
child’s school or a university’s laboratory. The Moral Identity Interview assessed the
different layers of moral identity across social contexts. For more details on the earlier
portions of the interview, see Chapter I (self-importance of moral values) and Chapter II
(moral identity motivation). After the self-importance of moral values and moral identity
motivation parts of the interview were over, similar to Recchia and colleagues (2013,
2015) who interviewed children and adolescents, each participant was asked to provide a
narrative account of a time when they hurt or upset someone in their family (“Tell me
about a time when you did or said something that ended up hurting or upsetting someone
in your family”), and then to provide a narrative account of a time when they helped
someone in their family (“Tell me about a time when you did or said something that
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ended up helping someone in your family”). The ordering of the moral context (harming
versus helping) was based on computer randomization for each participant in order to
control for order effects of the moral context. This process was then repeated for the
friends context (“Tell me about a time when you did or said something that ended up
hurting or upsetting [helping] one of your friends”).
Participants were provided a worksheet and instructed to think of some situations
for that type of event and then to briefly write down some keywords. If participants could
not come up with situations or experiences, the interviewer expressed to participants that
the event did not have to be recent nor did it have to be a big event. Once completed, the
interviewer asked the participant to narrate an account of one specific episode for that
type of event that stands out most to them. The interviewer encouraged elaboration with
follow-up prompts (e.g., “That’s interesting, tell me more about that”, “How did you feel
when that happened?”, “So we’ve talked about what you experienced from this, but how
did the other person react?”). Interviews were audiotaped and transcribed verbatim for
analysis.
Social desirability. For details on this measure, see Chapter I.
Coding and Reliability
Coding categories were deductively informed from past research examining moral
narratives of helping and harming with children and adolescents (Recchia et al., 2015), as
well as research examining autobiographical memories about past moral and immoral
actions (Krettenauer & Mosleh, 2013). The following coding categories derived from
Recchia et al. (2013, 2015) and Krettenauer and Mosleh (2013) were used as a
framework for the present study: type of harmful and helpful actions, the narrator’s
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reasons for engaging in harmful or helpful action, as well as self-event connection. As the
first study to examine both moral contexts and social contexts of narratives among
children and adolescents, these coding categories were chosen for the framework to
describe the narratives overall as well as to examine the narrator’s strength of self-event
connection. A subset of 47 transcripts (25% of total sample) was randomly selected
across the age groups and periods of the data collection to determine agreement between
two independent coders. Discrepancies between coders were discussed until consensus
was reached. For type of harmful and helpful actions, inter-coder agreement was κ = .86;
for the narrator’s reasons for harming or helping, it was κ = .81; for self-event
connection, it was κ = .73. Establishing inter-coder agreement took approximately one
month (November 6, 2017 to December 12, 2017) and then one coder completed coding
the remaining transcripts (n = 141) within one month following establishing inter-coder
reliability.
Types of harmful and helpful actions. Each narrative was coded for the
presence (1) or absence (0) of three possible types of actions: (a) material or concrete
forms of harming or helping (e.g., refusal to share, helping with schoolwork), (b) physical
forms of harming or helping (e.g., hitting, helping with injury), and (c) psychological or
emotional forms of harming or helping (e.g., teasing, gossiping, helping someone feel
better after a bad day).
Types of reasons for harm or help. Each narrative was coded for the presence
(1) or absence (0) of references to five possible reasons for engaging in harmful or
helpful behaviour: (a) external motivation or constraints (e.g., parents’ directives), (b)
self-interested or narrator’s perspective (e.g., pursuit of an instrumental goal), (c) other-
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interested or other’s perspective (e.g., prosocial intent), (d) response to other’s actions
(e.g., driven by anger), and (e) unintentional (e.g., accident). Similar to Sengsavang et al.
(2015) and Chapter II, if a participant articulated more than one motive for why he or she
engaged in the harmful or helpful event, all motives were coded separately. As such,
multiple codings were possible which reduced linear dependency between codes.
Strength of self-event connection. Each narrative was coded for the extent of
self-related insights or self-event connection, which was originally adapted from
narrative research (Pasupathi & Mansour, 2006; Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010b) and
utilized by Krettenauer and Mosleh (2013). The strength of these self-event connections
reflected the extent to which the past event or past experience was connected to the
narrator’s current self. Following Krettenauer and Mosleh (2013), there were five coding
categories for self-event connection: no self-event connection, dismissal, implicit selfevent connection, explicit self-event connection: confirming self-concept, and explicit
self-event connection: changing self-concept.
No self-event connection showed a lack of thought about the meaning and
relevance of the event for the narrator’s current self. The participant spent little or no time
reflecting on this event prior to the interview. For example:
After I felt pretty good and it wasn't as bad as I thought it was going to be and I
could tell that it really helped my mom out because she had a lot on her
plate…(Interviewer: OK and if a similar situation came up what would you do?) I
would help her out again because I know that we have some family friends
coming over again in February, so I'll help out again. (ID119, Grade 8, female,
13-years-old)
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A dismissal revealed that the event was unimportant to the self in which case the
participant clearly dismissed the event. There was little to no evidence of the event
having any effect on the narrator’s current self. For example: “It's in the past, so I say it's
in the past, it doesn’t matter anymore.” (ID016, Grade 4, female, 9-years-old)
Implicit self-event connection was apparent when participants showed evidence of
some reflection about the event, but no direct connection between the narrator’s current
self and the event. The event may have continued to work its way into the participant’s
consciousness and/or captures a recurring theme/behaviour, however an explicit
connection between self and event was not made. For example, “I think about it. It still
hurts but now it doesn’t, it’s not as bad.” (ID168, Grade 11, female, 16-years-old)
Explicit self-event connection showed that the event had a significant impact to
the narrator’s current self by either confirming or changing one’s self-view. The impact
goes beyond the immediate situation and appeared to have a lasting effect and still
relevant today. An example of an explicit confirming self-event connection:
Sometimes I feel like I’m a miracle worker with people, because they – my friends
–they’re so dramatic – they always get into like fights…I feel like I’m a miracle
worker. I can work things out between them. So yes, I felt good…I [still] feel like
a miracle worker. (ID161, Grade 10, female, 15-years-old)
An example of an explicit changing self-event connection:
Sometimes I really wish I didn’t have to do this and I wish that, people could
figure this out by themselves or at least try to understand. But then I always
remember back to how not everyone thinks the same way and for some people it’s
just so much harder to try and see someone else’s perspective and so I always
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think back how it’s actually a blessing or a gift of some kind that at least I am
someone who is able to understand other people’s perspective and so I feel like
it’s almost a responsibility of mine to just be there to help out…I’ve grown into
this position of being a person who is always kind of there as the middle person.
(ID171, Grade 10, female, 15-years-old)
Similar to Krettenauer and Mosleh (2013), codes were further combined given
that some categories were rare for some events. Dismissals were rarely evident in the
helping narratives (0% -1.1%) and with low frequency in the harming narratives (10.5%14.2%). Therefore, dismissals were combined with no self-event connection (see also
Krettenauer & Mosleh, 2013; Pasupathi & Mansour, 2006). For harmful narratives, rarely
were explicit confirming self-event connections made (1.1% for both social contexts) and
for helpful narratives, rarely were explicit changing self-event connections made (1.1%
and 1.6% respectively for the family and friends contexts). Thus, like Krettenauer and
Mosleh (2013), both categories of explicit self-event connection were combined to
represent overall explicit self-event connection. Following Krettenauer and Mosleh
(2013), codes were further combined for data analyses to represent categories of
increasing articulateness of self-event connection: no self-event connection or dismissal
(0) at the lower end of the scale, explicit self-event connection (2) at the higher end of the
scale, and implicit self-event connection in between (1). On average, the strength of the
self-event connection was M = 0.56, SD = .59 for the harmful narratives and M = 0.39,
SD = .61 for the helpful narratives on a scale that ranged from 0 to 2.
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Results
The primary goal was to examine age-related differences in how children and
adolescents narrate their past (im)moral experiences. First, preliminary analyses were
conducted to identify if any potential confound variables (i.e., social desirability, gender,
ethnicity, SES) related to age would be included as control variables in the main analyses.
In the present sample, both social desirability and SES were related to age and thus we
examined if these two variables were correlated with the narrative outcome variables.
Social desirability was negatively and significantly related to self-interested reasons for
harmful and helpful actions. On the other hand, SES was positively and significantly
related to both psychological or emotional types of harmful and helpful actions and
strength of self-event connection. Thus, social desirability was used as a control variable
in the main analyses involving reasons for harmful and helpful actions, while SES was
used as control variable in the main analyses involving type of harmful and helpful
actions as well as self-event connection. All bivariate correlations with means and
standard deviations can be found in Table 14.
Analyses of narrative content (type, reasons, self-event connection) were
conducted as a function of moral context (harm, help), social context (family, friends),
and age group (middle childhood, early adolescence, mid-adolescence) with moral
context and social context as the repeated measures. ANOVA-based procedures were
used given that this technique has been demonstrated to be acceptable for analyzing this
type of data (see Wainryb, Shaw, Laupa, & Smith, 2001). Tests of normality indicated
some of the measures were skewed, but these parametric tests have been demonstrated to
be robust to violations of normality (e.g., Blanca et al., 2017; Rasch & Guiard, 2004). All
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F-values reported are based on Pillai’s Trace test statistic given that it is considered the
most robust. Other test statistics (Wilk’s Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace, Roy’s Largest Root)
yielded slightly different F-values for some interactions, but all p-values reached the
same level of statistical significance.
Types of Harmful and Helpful Actions
A Moral Context x Social Context x Age Group mixed model multivariate
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with contexts (harm, help, family, friends) as the
repeated measures, the three age groups (middle childhood, early adolescence, midadolescence) as the between-subjects factor, and the three types of actions
(material/concrete, physical, psychological/emotional) as dependent variables was
performed, while controlling for SES.6 The MANCOVA revealed significant main effects
of type, F(2, 152) = 95.42, p < .001, h2p = .56, and social context, F(1, 153) = 9.13, p =
.003, h2p = .06, as well as a marginally significant main effect of age group, F(2, 152) =
2.65, p = .074, h2p = .03. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons (ps < .001, Bonferroni
corrected) revealed that psychological or emotion forms (M = .65, SD = .02) of harm/help
were described more than both material or concrete forms (M = .25, SD = .02) and
physical forms (M = .19, SD = .02). These main effects, however, were qualified by three
significant two-way interactions: Type x Age Group, F(4, 306) = 3.61, p = .007, h2p =
.05, Type x Moral Context, F(2, 152) = 56.10, p < .001, h2p = .42, and Type x Social
Context, F(2, 152) = 4.59, p = .012, h2p = .06.

Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the main effect of type, c2 (2)
= .91, p = .001. Greenhouse-Geisser corrected tests (∈ = .92) yielded slightly different degrees of freedom,
but the F-value and p-value remained the same.
6
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Differences between age group for types of harmful and helpful actions (averaged
across contexts) were followed up by univariate ANOVAs and post-hoc tests (Scheffé; p
< .05). Results revealed significant differences for physical forms, F(2, 183) = 6.11 p =
.003, h2p = .06, and for psychological or emotional forms, F(2, 183) = 6.44, p = .002, h2p
= .07 (see Table 15). For physical forms of harm/help, participants in the youngest age
group of middle childhood scored the highest and significantly differed from participants
in early adolescence (p = .029, CI[.03, .79], d = .44) and mid-adolescence (p = .006,
CI[.13, .92], d = .60). For psychological or emotional forms, participants in middle
childhood scored the lowest and significantly differed from the oldest age group of midadolescence (p = .002, CI[.22, 1.23], d = .66) and marginally from participants in early
adolescence (p = .07, CI[-.03, .95], d = .38). Thus, physical forms of harm/help appear to
decrease with age, while psychological or emotional forms of harm/help appear to
increase during this period.
Mean differences of type of harm/help by moral context are summarized in Table
16. Psychological or emotional forms was most salient in the harmful context (M = 1.52,
SD = .64) and in the helpful context, psychological or emotional forms (M = .91, SD =
.80) and material or concrete forms (M = .82, SD = .75) were equally salient. Pairwise
comparisons (t-tests, p < .003) yielded significant differences between the harmful and
helpful contexts for all types of harm/help. Thus, participants made more references to
material or concrete types of actions in the help narratives than for harm narratives (p <
.001, CI[.48, .72], d = .96), engaged in more physical types of actions in the help than
harm narratives (p = .002, CI[.07, .28], d = .30), as well as had more psychological or
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emotional types of actions in the harm than help narratives (p < .001, CI[.48, .73], d =
.84).
Mean differences of type of harm/help by social context are summarized in Table
17. In terms of type, pairwise comparisons (t-tests, p < .001) yielded significant
differences only for the material or concrete type of harm/help such that participants
reported higher levels of this type of harm/help in the family context compared to the
friends context (p < .001, CI[.12, .34], d = .88). In terms of social contexts, pairwise
comparisons with a Bonferroni correction showed that in the family context, participants
reported significantly more psychological or emotional harm/help compared to material
or concrete (p < .001, CI[.35, .77], d = .83) and physical types of harm/help (p < .001,
CI[.60, .99], d = 1.23). Moreover, participants reported significantly more material or
concrete harm/help than physical harm/help (p = .004, CI[.06, .41], d = .38). In the
friends context, psychological or emotional harm/help was reported significantly more
often than both material or concrete (p < .001, CI[.66, 1.05], d = 1.34) and physical
harm/help (p < .001, CI[.71, 1.11], d = 1.42).
Reasons for Engaging in Harmful and Helpful Actions
A Moral Context x Social Context x Age Group mixed model MANCOVA with
contexts (harm, help, family, friends) as the repeated measures, the three age groups
(middle childhood, early adolescence, mid-adolescence) as the between-subjects factor,
and the five types of reasons (external constraints, self-interested, other-interested,
response to others’ actions, and unintentional) as dependent variables was performed,
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while controlling for social desirability.7 The MANCOVA revealed a significant main
effect of reasons, F(4, 140) = 158.05, p < .001, h2p = .82. Post-hoc comparisons with a
Bonferroni correction revealed that external constraints were reported significantly less
than all other types of reasons (ps < .001). Self-interested reasons were reported
significantly less than other-interested reasons (p = .032), but significantly higher than
unintentional reasons (p < .001). Both other-interested and response to others’ actions
reasons were reported significantly more than unintentional reasons (p’s < .001). For
means and standard deviations, see Table 18.
This main effect, however, was qualified by two significant two-way interactions:
Reasons x Moral Context, F(4, 140) = 308.78, p < .001, h2p = .90, and Reasons x Social
Context, F(4, 140) = 4.10, p = .004, h2p = .10. Moreover, these two-way interactions
were qualified by a significant three-way interaction, Reasons x Moral Context x Social
Context, F(4, 140) = 5.21, p = .001, h2p = .13. The nature of this three-way interaction is
illustrated in Figure 4. A follow-up analysis of the pattern of means revealed that the
difference between the family and friends context varied across reasons for action and
moral context. In the context of harm narratives, three categories of reasons for action
were most salient with higher levels of self-interested and response to others’ actions
among harmful actions with the family compared to friends, while unintentional harmful
actions were more common among friends than family. A different pattern was found in
the context of help narratives. Here, there were only two categories of reasons for action

Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the main effect of reasons, c2
(9) = .38, p < .001, and the interactions between reasons and social context, c2 (9) = .44, p < .001, reasons
and moral context, c2 (9) = .29, p < .001, and the interaction between reasons, social context, and moral
context, c2 (9) = .33, p < .001. Greenhouse-Geisser corrected tests (∈ = .75, .78, .67, .76 respectively)
yielded slightly different degrees of freedom, but the F-values and p-values remained the same.
7

MORAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT

80

that were most salient: other-interested and responses to others’ actions. In both
categories, participants referred to other-interested and response to others’ actions more
frequently with helpful actions with friends than with family. Interestingly, there were no
unintentional reasons for helpful actions, but this was a major reason category for
harmful actions.
Strength of Self-Event Connections
A Moral Context x Social Context x Age Group mixed model MANCOVA with
contexts (harm, help, family, friends) as the repeated measures, the three age groups
(middle childhood, early adolescence, mid-adolescence) as the between-subjects factor,
and the strength of the self-event connection as the dependent variable was performed,
while controlling for SES. The MANCOVA revealed significant main effects of age
group, F(2, 152) = 12.46, p < .001, h2p = .14, and moral context, F(2, 153) = 8.78, p =
.004, h2p = .05.
Post-hoc tests (Scheffé; p < .001) revealed that the oldest age group (M = 2.93,
SD = 2.09) had significantly higher scores in strength of self-event connection compared
to both participants in middle childhood (M = 1.11, SD = 1.40) (p < .001, CI[1.01, 2.63],
d = 1.03) and participants in early adolescence (M = 1.63, SD = 1.86) (p < .001, CI[.49,
2.10], d = .66). In order to better understand the main effect of age group on self-event
connection, see Figure 5 for sum scores of each self-event connection category by age
group. It is evident that no self-event connection/dismissal decreases with age, while
implicit self-event connection, and both types of explicit self-event connection increases
with age. In terms of moral context, post-hoc tests (t-test, p = .001, d = .30) revealed that
the strength of self-event connection was significantly higher in the harmful narratives (M
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= .57, SD = .59) than in the helpful narratives (M = .34, SD = .61). Therefore, self-event
connection appears to increase with age and participants were able to draw more selfevent connections from their past harmful behaviours compared to their past helpful
behaviours.
Although the two categories of explicit self-event connections (confirming versus
changing) were combined in how we measured strength of self-event connection due to
overall low frequencies, we wanted to do a follow-up analysis and investigate age-related
differences in these two explicit categories of self-event connections by performing a
series of one-way ANOVAs. The rates were examined across social contexts given that
the frequencies were quite low in some categories (e.g., 1.1% of participants indicated
confirming one’s self-view in family harm narratives) and as such combined across the
family and friends contexts. Results indicated that the three age groups significantly
differed with regard to rates of confirming one’s self-view in the helpful narratives, F(2,
181) = 5.45, p = .005, h2p = .06, as well as in terms of the rates of changing one’s selfview in the harmful narratives, F(2, 181) = 7.15, p = .001, h2p = .07. Post-hoc tests
(Scheffé; p < .05) revealed that the oldest age group of mid-adolescence (M = .46, SD =
.68) reported significantly higher rates of the past helpful event confirming one’s selfview compared to both participants in middle childhood (M = .17, SD = .42) (p = .018,
CI[.04, .52], d = .52) and participants in early adolescence (M = .17, SD = .49) (p = .016,
CI[.04, .53], d = .50). A similar pattern was also found with the rates of changing one’s
self-view in the harmful narratives such that the youngest age group had significantly
lower rates (M = .03, SD = .18) compared to participants in early adolescence (M = .25,
SD = .53) (p = .037, CI[.01, .43], d = .55) and participants in mid-adolescence (M = .35,
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SD = .61) (p = .002, CI[.10, .53], d = .73). Thus, it appears that participants increasingly
with age reported higher levels of the past helpful event confirming one’s self view,
while also reporting higher levels of past harmful events changing one’s self-view.
Discussion
The present study was designed to examine age-related differences in children’s
and adolescents’ third layer of moral identity. Specifically, we aimed to examine age
differences in narrative descriptions of past immoral and moral actions as well as the
extent to which children versus adolescents connect these past events to their current self.
This was the first study to examine both moral contexts (harm, help) as well as social
contexts (family, friends) to better understand how children and adolescents narrate and
interpret their past moral failures and moral achievements. This novel study was
significant given that human development is complex and it is important to study
development in the context of multiple environments (for an overview, see
Bronfenbrenner, 1979) because children’s and adolescents’ understanding of their past
experiences may vary from context to context – as this study demonstrated. Replicating,
and importantly, extending previous research, our results revealed numerous distinctions
between narrator’s accounts of harmful and helpful actions with family and friends,
suggesting that there are meaningful asymmetries in their experiences of these (im)moral
events that also differ depending on the social context. In terms of age-related
differences, our findings revealed distinct age-related patterns for the type of
harmful/helpful actions as well as for the strength of self-event connection. Interestingly,
the rates of explicit confirming and explicit changing self-event connections also differed
based on age and type of moral event. Therefore, the way children and adolescents
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construe their past morally relevant experiences evolve with age and depends on whether
the experience was transgressive (harmful) or prosocial (helpful), as well as whether the
event took place with their family or friends. In the following, these findings and their
implications are discussed in detail.
Does Context Impact How Children and Adolescents Narrate and Understand Past
(Im)Moral Experiences?
Previous research examining narratives about past (im)moral experiences have
not examined the two moral contexts of harm and help, as well as the two social contexts
of family and friends simultaneously. The present study adds unique patterns of findings
to the literature that replicate and extend past research in a single empirical investigation,
while also adding validity to this narrative method given that children and adolescents
were indeed responsive to the context in mind. In terms of the moral context, what was
most significant was how participants’ reasoning for engaging and their strength of selfevent connection changed depending on whether the action was harmful or helpful.
Similar to Recchia et al. (2015), participants often referred to self-focused, response to
others’ actions, and unintentional reasons for engaging in harmful behaviours, while
referring to other-focused and response to others’ actions as reasons in the helpful
context. This finding was somewhat in contrast to Proulx and Chandler’s (2009) finding
of increased context dependency and multiplicity in self-constructions with age given that
in the present study, regardless of age, participants did not only narrate their bad
behaviours as externally provoked and good behaviours as internally motivated. The way
participants narrate their past (im)moral behaviour appears to be more complex than what
Proulx and Chandler (2009) originally proposed, especially given that there was no main
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effect of age in participants’ reasons for engaging in (im)moral behaviour. It is important
to note that participants in Proulx and Chandler’s (2009) study were asked to explain
motivations behind the fictional character Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde rather than asking
participants to reflect on their own past (im)moral behaviour, which could explain the
discrepancy in findings between the studies. Our findings certainly support the notion
that reasons or motivations for behaviour are indeed context-dependent. Therefore,
reasons for engaging in (im)moral behaviour appear to be more dependent on the context
in which the individual is situated in rather than the age of the individual. This
importantly informs developmental theory such that context is an important factor when
understanding children’s and adolescent’s reasonings for engaging in behaviour. When
disciplining and/or rewarding children, adults need to be sure to have children actively
reflect on their past moral and immoral behaviours separately. Consequently, children are
likely to become more self-aware of their behaviours that are often goal-directed in some
way, whether it be other-oriented or self-oriented, and discuss the consequences of their
behaviours (e.g., feelings evoked from the behaviour) in order to promote future positive
action and reflection.
At the same time, participants were able to draw more self-event connections
from their past harmful behaviours compared to their past helpful behaviours. Therefore,
although harmful acts were often driven by self-interested concerns, participants were
able to reflect more deeply on this type of past behaviour and connect them to their
current self, compared to help narratives. This is a novel finding in the literature and
provides important implications for moral identity development. Often researchers
examine reasons or motivations for (im)moral behaviour, but future research should also
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investigate how the type of (im)moral behaviour – regardless of whether the reason
behind the act was self-oriented or other-oriented – may in fact greatly shape one’s sense
of self and subsequent behaviour. For example, one participant described a recent time
when she hurt her friend’s feelings because the participant revealed she was
uncomfortable after her friend confided in her and shared a personal confession that
occurred years prior. This was a self-focused and unintentional form of harm given that
the participant was only focused on her own perspective and feelings, but did not intend
to harm her friend. However, later in her narrative she explained:
I definitely tried to explain myself [to my friend]. I think giving some time and
some space was part of the way to help, I guess to ease the tension. But after
reflecting on it myself and what I would do if this situation were to ever happen
again, that was what I thought a lot about … I guess just being really sincere
about it and telling them, I understand, actually I don’t understand but I’m
definitely willing to accept it. I’m cool with it, that’s the best I could and can do.
(ID171, Grade 10, female, 15-years-old)
By reflecting on this experience, the participant connected her past behaviour to her
present self and it helped explicitly change her self-view to be more accepting and
understanding of others in the future. This finding was in contrast to Recchia et al. (2015)
who found that self-event connections were more prominent in youth’s help narratives
than harm narratives. This difference could lie in how self-event connections were coded
in the present study compared to Recchia and colleagues. Recchia et al. (2015) coded
self-event connections or self-related insights slightly differently than the present study
given that their coding was also based on self-evaluations (e.g., ““I reacted wrong”” (p.
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868)) and personally significant statements (e.g., ““It was the worst fight that I’d ever
had”” (p. 868)), in addition to self-event connections. Therefore, Recchia et al. (2015) did
not code strictly for self-event connection and thus their findings related to self-event
connections also reflect self-evaluations and personal statements. The present study
focused only on self-event connections and the degree to which the past event connected
to the narrator’s current sense of self. It is important to also note that Recchia and
colleagues mentioned that these self-event connections might become increasingly more
prevalent in harm narratives in later adolescence and adulthood (see also Pasupathi &
Mansour, 2006), which the present study supports given that our sample was slightly
older. Nonetheless, it would be vital to extend this research from a more lifespan
perspective by examining participants in middle childhood to adulthood.
In terms of social context, it is well known that relationships with friends and
relationships with family (e.g., siblings) have distinct characteristics, especially in
childhood and adolescence. Friendships are voluntary and based on mutuality and
reciprocity and often have greater quality and intimacy compared to family relationships
(i.e., siblings) (see Buhrmester, 1992; Derkman, Engels, Kuntsche, van, & Scholte,
2011). As such, close friendships are extremely important and youth aim to protect and
maintain these relationships. On the other hand, family relationships are involuntary and
there is less perceived risk for an end to the relationship (Vandell & Bailey, 1992).
Compared to peers and friends, conflicts in the home with siblings are more intense, often
lack reasoning and are more likely to lead to aggression (e.g., Laursen & Adams, 2018;
Laursen, Finkelstein, & Betts, 2001). Thus, it is unsurprising that the present study found
results supporting this relationship difference similar to Recchia et al. (2013). During this
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age period of middle childhood to adolescence, one’s reasons for engaging in harmful
and helpful behaviours seem to reflect a stronger investment in friendships to maintain
harmony compared to familial relationships. Indeed, among our participants, harm
against friends was described as more unintentional and more other-focused for helping
behaviour compared to these same narratives with family. As children age, relationships
within the family – specifically sibling relationships – become more egalitarian with
support and intimacy (e.g., Buhrmester, 1992; Kim, McHale, Osgood, & Crouter, 2006).
Therefore, it would be interesting to compare narratives about past (im)moral behaviour
with family and friends across the lifespan. It is probable that one’s understanding of
harmful and helpful actions with family versus friends will converge with age such that
reasons for these behaviours will be similar regardless of the relationship. Nevertheless, it
is also important for future research to keep in mind the quality and closeness of family
relationships compared to friendships when examining these types of narratives across
the lifespan.
Age-Related Changes in Narrative Accounts of Harmful and Helpful Actions
Our findings suggested two important age-related changes in children’s and
adolescents’ narrative accounts of harmful and helpful actions that confirm wellestablished developmental trends in the narrative field (e.g., Krettenauer & Mosleh, 2013;
Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010b; Recchia et al., 2013, 2015). Firstly and unsurprisingly,
physical forms of harm and help were described most in the youngest age group (middle
childhood) and appeared to decrease with age. On the other hand, psychological forms of
harm and help were described more often in the two older age groups (early adolescence
and mid-adolescence) compared to the youngest age group. Therefore, experiences of
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help and harm became less physically based and more psychologically based from middle
childhood to adolescence. This pattern was the same for events with the family and with
friends.
Similar to Krettenauer and Mosleh (2013), Pasupathi and Mansour (2006), and
Recchia et al. (2015), the extent to which participants connected their past experience to
their current sense of self increased with age. In fact, no self-event connection or
dismissal decreased with age, while both types of explicit confirming and explicit
changing self-event connection increased with age (see Figure 5). Moreover, the present
study adds a unique contribution to the literature given the specificity in our findings
related to the increase in self-event connection with age. In particular, with age,
participants reported higher levels of past helpful events explicitly confirming their selfview, while also reporting a greater degree of past harmful events explicitly changing
their self-view. These findings are also consistent with Pasupathi et al. (2015) who found
that participants drew more growth conclusions (i.e., positive perceived changes in one’s
understanding of the self and the world) in perpetrator narratives wherein the participant
harmed another person. This makes sense given that individuals may ruminate or dwell
more on their past moral failures compared to their moral achievements and thus desire to
actively reflect on and make sense of how the past moral wrongdoing shapes or affects
how they see themselves and how they want to be in the future. From a developmental
perspective, with age, individuals may seek to integrate and connect their past
experiences and reflect on how those experiences shape their current self: What has led
me to be who I am today? How am I different or the same after this happened? It is well
known that individuals desire a sense of connection over time between past experiences
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and present concerns and future goals that ultimately shape their identity (e.g., Erikson,
1959/1980; McAdams, 2001; McLean & Pasupathi, 2012).
In addition to the difference in self-event connection coding between Recchia et
al. (2015) and the present study, perhaps Recchia et al. (2015) found more self-event
connections in youth’s help narratives than in harm narratives because they did not
distinguish between explicit confirming and explicit changing self-event connections in
their coding. Again, contrary to Proulx and Chandler (2009), there does not seem to be a
general developmental trend towards increased multiplicity and context-dependency in
one’s self-constructions to imagine one’s bad behaviours as externally provoked and
good behaviours as internally motivated. If older participants were better able to
externalize their immoral behaviours, as Proulx and Chandler (2009) proposed, we would
not have found age-related differences in the explicit self-event connections for both
harmful and helpful actions. Therefore, even in the harmful context, older participants
take on a sense of moral responsibility and were able to connect their past wrongdoing to
their current self by changing one’s self-view rather than blaming their wrongdoing on
external reasons.
These age differences, as well as individual differences, in self-event connection
may be linked to larger developmental gains, as outlined by Pasupathi and Mansour
(2006). Pasupathi and Mansour (2006) examined self-event connections in important
non-specific life narratives and suggested the adaptive nature of these connections given
the potential gains in mental and physical health, as well as interpersonal benefits. In
terms of the moral domain and reflecting on past (im)moral behaviour, these age-related
differences could also demonstrate developmental gains in the health and interpersonal
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areas. For example, a past moral event confirming one’s self-view may lead to greater
personal well-being and enhanced self-worth given that the past behaviour aligns with
one’s current moral values. At the same time, a past immoral event changing one’s selfview may lead to self-transformation (see Pasupathi & Mansour, 2006) given that selfevent connection might be similar to coherent positive resolution, which has also been
coded for in life narratives. Coherent positive resolution is seen as a type of
transformational processing as one reflects on the past event and creates a sense of
change in one’s self, which is also central to one’s narrative identity (see Pals, 2006).
This type of processing has been associated with greater emotional well-being, including
higher levels of optimism and lower levels of depressive symptoms, compared to those
who exhibited less coherent positive resolution in their narratives (Dumas, Lawford,
Tieu, & Pratt, 2009).
Evidently, future research needs to continue examining self-event connections in
narratives about past experiences across the lifespan to better delineate age as well as
context effects, while also exploring its relation to well-being and behaviour. The ability
to form self-event connections is an important mechanism of identity development,
specifically the development of the third layer of personality. By reflecting on past
(im)moral actions, it contributes to moral identity development and how one may view
morality as imperative to their sense of self. Thus, it is also important for educators and
parents to ensure that their children and students, especially in high school, are reflecting
on their past moral achievements as well as moral failures to better facilitate the
development of moral understanding and a more mature sense of moral agency. Whether
the past moral event confirms or changes one’s self-view, it appears that with age
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reflecting on one’s past behaviour increases the strength of self-event connection from
merely no connection or dismissal to more explicit forms of self-event connection.
Through these reflections, one might be better able to understand themselves and others
in the context of how their morally laden actions go beyond the actual event itself and
rooted in goals and beliefs.
Limitations and Conclusions
The present study’s overall major limitations were discussed in Chapter I (i.e.,
cross-sectional design, limited age-range, public versus catholic school boards,
predominately European-descent sample), but there are some specific limitations related
to this study. Given the narrative nature of the study, selection bias in the events that
participants chose to narrate was a possibility, though social desirability does not seem to
play a large role in explaining age and context differences in observed patterns in these
types of data (see Recchia et al., 2015; Wainryb et al., 2005). Moreover, we cannot
generalize these findings across different relationships. For instance, future research
should examine whether these harmful and helpful experiences with a parent, sibling,
best friend(s), and other friends or peers would change the pattern of effects. Finally, the
study was correlational in nature and we cannot draw any causal conclusions. For
example, physical forms of harm decreased with age which could suggest that
participants engaged in less physical forms of harm over time or it could also suggest that
older participants were less likely to discuss physical forms of harm. At the same time,
other factors altogether, such as social conventions and past consequences of physical
forms of harm, might explain why this type of harm decreased across middle childhood
and adolescence.
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Despite the limitations, the present study adds an important contribution to the
literature by considering similarities and differences between transgressive and prosocial
experiences separately for family and friends when examining narrative accounts of past
morally relevant experiences. Importantly, these findings related to context and age were
not only statistically significant, but also had practical significance given that the effect
sizes (Cohen’s d) were mainly medium to large. Practically, this means that the way
children and adolescents understand and interpret past morally relevant events depend on
the moral and/or social context of the situation, as well as changes with age. By
comparing the effect sizes of social context (e.g., reasons x social, h2p = .10) and moral
context (reasons x moral, h2p = .90), it appeared that the moral context was more
important than the social context in how children and adolescents reason and connect to
past morally relevant behaviour. Most importantly, this study has the potential to inform
parents, educators, and future research on ways to help support moral identity
development, specifically their moral understanding of the self and therefore, others.
Across all ages, parents and educators need to encourage their children and students to
actively reflect on their past moral and immoral behaviour given that they gain different
insights about themselves in each of these moral contexts. By gaining greater insight on
the self as a moral person through active reflection, hopefully we can enrich these moral
citizens to engage together in a more compassionate and caring world.

CHAPTER IV: Relationships Between the Three Layers of Moral Identity
The focus of each chapter of this dissertation has been one of three layers of
moral identity, but how do these layers of moral identity relate to each other? Bivariate
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correlations between key study variables of each layer of moral identity were examined,
controlling for age given that there were age-related differences at each layer (see Table
19). After controlling for age, similar to Krettenauer and Victor (2017), the first layer of
moral identity (mean-level of self-importance of moral values) was positively and
marginally significantly related to internal moral identity motivation at the second layer,
r(183) = .14, p = .061. It is important to note that although the relationship between
mean-level of moral identity (layer one) and internal moral identity motivation (layer
two) was marginally significant, it is consistent and similar in strength (r = .14) to
Krettenauer and Victor’s (2017) finding with a larger sample of adolescents and adults.
The second layer of moral identity motivation was also significantly related to the third
layer of moral identity, such that internal moral identity motivation was positively related
to strength of self-event connection, r(183) = .18, p = .017. The first layer and third layer
of moral identity were unrelated, r(183) = .09, ns. Evidently, there was a substantial
relationship between the second and third layers of moral identity, and a marginal
relationship between the first and second layers. Finally, supporting previous research
connecting moral identity to moral behaviour (see Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016), the three
layers of moral identity seem to be related to moral behaviour, specifically antisocial
behaviour. These follow-up analyses support the notion that there are three layers to
moral identity given that they appear to be somewhat related to one another as well as to
moral behaviour.
Although these effect sizes were small (r’s = .14 and .18), they allude to some
important theoretical and practical significance. In terms of developmental theory, this
was the first study to examine moral identity development, especially the three layers,
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prior to adolescence and the findings suggest that layers of moral identity are present and
already appear to relate to each other in younger developmental age periods, which is
worth studying. From middle childhood to adolescence, individuals are becoming more
self-aware of their moral understanding while also navigating new experiences, new
environments, and new friendships. As such, aspects or layers of their identity may be
more related than others, especially in terms of their motivations (i.e., why they want to
be this way or why they engage in specific behaviours) and the ability to draw
connections to past experiences to their current sense of self (i.e., confirming versus
changing one’s self-view). As individuals enter adulthood and become less differentiated
and more integrated with their sense of self across contexts, these layers might become
more related to each other. Evidently, future research is needed that examines these
layers of moral identity across middle childhood to adulthood. Practically, the findings
also suggest that it might be worth pursing interventions to further enhance these layers
by emphasizing environments that both foster internal motivation and stress the
importance of active reflection of past (im)moral actions. Despite the small effect size,
the relationship between these layers is present and it is continuously important to
contribute to developmental theory as well as to pursue ways to foster moral
understanding and moral citizens.
The trait layer of moral identity, however, seemed to be the most different layer of
moral identity compared to the motivation and narrative layers. This was especially
apparent when comparing age-related patterns across the three layers and only the first
layer exhibited a decline in moral identity (i.e., self-importance of moral values) in terms
of traits, whereas the other two layers exhibited general positive increases with age.
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Moreover, the trait layer was not as strongly related to the other layers. There are a
number of potential explanations for the variation in the trait layer compared to the
motivation and narrative layers of moral identity.
First, the decline in the self-importance of moral values could indicate a
transformation in identity formation in the adolescent years. Identity development may
not be as linear at the trait layer given that there are fluctuations in identity and it
continues to develop throughout the lifespan. Erikson (1968, 1980) was the first to
conceptualize identity as a multidimensional construct and given developmental changes
and transitions in environment, an individual’s identity is subject to both change and
transformation. This meaningful notion can also be applied to moral identity
development. Marcia (1966) built on Erikson’s model of identity and outlined two key
identity processes described by Erikson that could be used in empirical research: identity
exploration and identity commitment. These processes led to the creation of Marcia’s
identity statuses based on the level of exploration and commitment (for an overview, see
Luyckx, Schwartz, Goossens, Beyers, & Missotten, 2011; Schwartz, Donnellan, Ravert,
Luyckz, & Zamboanga, 2013). Based on their research program, Meeus and colleagues
(e.g., Crocetti, Rubini, & Meeus, 2008; Meeus, van de Schoot, Keijsers, Schwartz, &
Branje, 2010) argued that individuals enter adolescence with a more foreclosed identity
status (high commitment, low exploration) with commitments internalized from parents
and these commitments can be reassessed as part of the process in becoming more
autonomous and one developing their own identity separate from their parents. In
particular, “during adolescence, individuals manage their commitments in two ways:
through in-depth exploration and through reconsideration [of commitments]” (Meeus et
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al., 2010, p. 1567). In a large longitudinal study spanning throughout adolescence, Meeus
et al. (2010) found various identity progression as well as identity regression transitions,
which indicates that adolescents may reconsider commitments, while considering
alternative ones. Interestingly, they also found that the “early closure/closure” identity
status (similar to foreclosure) was the most prevalent status in the sample, again
providing evidence that individuals entering adolescence have a more foreclosed status
compared to later age groups.
In line with this view, the personality trait of openness tends to increase during
the transition to adulthood (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006), which suggests the
allowance for more identity exploration during this time period (Schwartz et al., 2013).
Children and early adolescents may appear to have a foreclosed identity, reflecting higher
scores in mean-level of self-importance of moral values (layer one). As they move
through adolescence into adulthood they likely engage in a more moratorium identity
status (high exploration, low commitment) as they navigate new environments and social
situations (e.g., high school, university), which may result in temporarily lower identity
commitment and thus lower scores in mean-level of moral identity. Adolescence is also a
developmental period wherein individuals become more social and more sensitive to
social inclusion (e.g., Brown, 2004; Mrazek, Harada, & Chiao, 2015; Steinberg & Morris,
2001). With the added social pressures, their sense of identity is likely fluctuating with
greater degrees of exploration and a temporary decline in commitment as they try to
understand themselves and become their own person. The above research on identity
exploration and commitment point to the conception that at the trait layer, there may not
be a continuous linear increase in identity commitment and thus mean-level of moral
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identity may also fluctuate over the lifespan, especially from childhood to adulthood.
Unfortunately, there has yet to be longitudinal research examining how these processes in
identity formation appear prior to adolescence and a more lifespan approach is needed.
Another possible explanation for why the trait layer of moral identity exhibited
different patterns than both the motivation and narrative layers of moral identity could be
that the general importance of values and traits may not take fruition until adolescence
and adulthood, as traditional identity theorists suggest. In childhood, there could be a lack
of connection between abstract value attributes and their own motivations and interests,
and as such, mean-level of traits may not be adequately present in younger developmental
periods. Children are able to communicate their reasons and motivations, and are able to
reflect on past behaviour (layer two and layer three of moral identity), but these may not
yet be coherently linked to how they view themselves in terms of traits. For example,
children know they like to be honest and not lie because it allows others to view them
more positively, but they may not have explicitly connected this to their general sense of
self as an honest person. Therefore, mean-level of moral identity as reflected at the trait
layer of personality may not yet be directly connected to the other two layers. In fact,
when examining mean-level change in personality traits, Roberts et al. (2006) concluded
that mean-level change in traits is more prevalent in young adulthood than in adolescence
(except for openness which increases in adolescence), though they did not have children
in their study nor did they examine moral attributes.
Finally, we cannot rule out that it could be a methodological issue when
examining the self-importance of moral values given that this approach has not been
conducted with samples younger than adolescence. It is also important to note that unlike
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Krettenauer et al. (2016), we did not provide our sample with a choice to choose which
moral attributes they considered as descriptive of a highly moral person. Perhaps if our
younger sample was able to select their own moral attributes that resonated with them,
our findings may be different. At the same time, the developmental age period itself may
be attributable to explain the results at the trait layer of moral identity given that the
positivity bias or self-serving bias has been documented to be especially salient from ages
8- to 11-years-old (for an overview, see Trzesniewski et al., 2011). When examining
children’s moral self-concept, Krettenauer and colleagues (2013) found a decrease in the
moral self with age from 5- to 12-years-old, which again could suggest the positivity bias
inherent with the younger sample.
It is apparent that a more lifespan view of moral identity development at all three
layers needs to be further explored in theory and in data collection to better understand
how each layer develops over time and are related to each other from childhood to
adulthood. Moral identity development is likely not linear at all layers given that identity
commitment changes qualitatively with greater in-depth exploration and reconsideration
of commitments occurring in the adolescent years prior to adulthood. It is also reasonable
to believe that the layers become increasingly related throughout the lifespan.

General Discussion and Conclusion
Moral psychology has questioned the nature of human morality and its
development, as well as searched for explanations for why individuals behave morally.
Blasi’s (1980, 1983, 1984) introduction of moral identity as an explanatory construct to
understanding moral development has shaped the empirical landscape in this area for the
last several decades. Throughout the hundreds of published articles following Blasi’s
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work, moral identity has been recognised as an important development dimension, but
there has been a lack of documented systematic developmental trends on the construct.
The leading two approaches to studying moral identity, trait-based and sociocognitive,
arguably do not place development at the forefront and heavily rely on a single layer of
personality description (for an overview, see Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015). The
personological approach, on the other hand, provides a rich source for studying moral
identity development across the lifespan and includes the three layers important to
studying moral personality and development (see Pratt & Hardy, 2014; Walker, 2014).
Identity is more complex than simply traits or schema formation and action, and thus can
be differentiated into multiple layers with varying age-related patterns.
While this integrative approach is promising and evidence has suggested
developmental changes on these layers (predominately with adolescents and adults) (see
Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015), no single empirical investigation has investigated age-related
patterns on all three layers. At the same time, it is important to address what Nucci (2004)
identified as a major weakness of research on moral identity and focus on the
understudied developmental period of middle childhood to adolescence. The vast
majority of moral identity research centres on adolescence and emerging adulthood given
that it has been deemed the “critical developmental period” of identity formation (e.g.,
Hardy & Carlo, 2011b). Arguably, identity, and more specifically moral identity, is a
lifelong process that is not exclusive to adolescence and beyond (e.g., Damon, 1996;
Krettenauer et al., 2016), especially given the evidence of the moral self in childhood.
The present dissertation aimed to better understand how the multifaceted concept
of moral identity develops across the lifespan. Given research by Krettenauer and
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colleagues (2016, 2017, in press), moral identity can be described as a context-dependent
self-structure that develops across the lifespan from adolescence to adulthood. However,
what about its development prior to adolescence? More specifically, the main research
question of this dissertation was: how does moral identity form in the course of individual
development during middle childhood to adolescence?
Chapter I focused on the first layer of moral identity (traits) and was the first of its
kind to examine mean-level and cross-context differentiation of moral identity across
middle childhood and adolescence. Participants were asked to rate the self-importance of
13-value attributes that were most frequently chosen by the youngest adolescent age
group in Krettenauer et al.’s (2016) study that described a highly moral person.
Participants rated these value attributes separately for the social contexts most relevant to
this developmental age period: family, friends, and school. Age-related patterns were
found on this layer of moral identity with mean-level of moral identity (averaged across
all three contexts) decreasing with age, while cross-context differentiation increased with
age. Moreover, similar to previous research, parental support was a positive predictor of
moral identity above and beyond social desirability, age, and parent-child negative
interactions.
Chapter II centred on the second layer of moral identity (motivations) by asking
participants to elaborate on the moral attributes they identified as extremely important to
the self in the procedure described in Chapter I. As expected, moral identity motivation
varied by both age and social context. Consistent with Self-Determination Theory (see
Deci & Ryan, 2012), external moral identity motivation and relationship-oriented moral
identity motivation decreased with age, while internal moral identity motivation
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increased with age. In line to what previous research suggests, this second layer of moral
identity was indeed context-specific such that rates of internal, external, and relationshiporiented moral identity motivation depended on whether the context was family, friends,
or school. For instance, external moral identity motivation was highest in the school
context compared to the family and friends contexts, while internal moral identity
motivation was most salient in the contexts of family and friends. This layer of moral
identity was also predictive of moral behaviour, specifically those reporting higher levels
of internal moral identity motivation had lower levels of teacher-reported antisocial
behaviour.
Chapter III addressed the third layer of moral identity by focusing on narrative
accounts of past moral failures (harming others) and past moral achievements (helping
others) in the context of family and friends. This approach was different from past
narrative studies because this was the first study to empirically examine both types of
moral contexts (transgressive, prosocial) as well as social contexts (family, friends) to
better understand how children’s and adolescents’ descriptions and interpretations of their
past morally relevant events connect to their current sense of self. As expected, results
indicated age-related patterns in the ability to connect past experiences to one’s present
sense of self by either confirming or changing one’s self-view. This chapter also
illuminated meaningful asymmetries in children’s and adolescents’ experiences and
interpretations of past (im)moral actions that also depend on the social context. For
example, reasons for engaging in behaviour were different for past harmful and helpful
behaviours with more emphasis on self-oriented reasons in the harmful context and more
other-oriented reasons in the helpful context. Moreover, reflecting on past harmful
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actions led to more self-event connections compared to past helpful actions. This chapter
importantly added validity to this narrative method given that children and adolescents
were able to differentiate and be responsive to the separate contexts.
Overall, the separate analyses of the three research topics (traits, motivations, and
narratives) described in the chapters provide concrete evidence for utilizing the
personological approach to moral identity development. In his commentary to
Krettenauer and Hertz (2015), Lapsley (2015) was concerned about the degree to which
the personological approach yields developmental potential and that it “still requires
developmental specification. It still needs to show how developmental processes in
childhood influence the trajectory of moral identity in adolescence and adulthood” (p.
169). This dissertation addresses Lapsley’s concern – albeit through a cross-sectional
design – by providing empirical age-related patterns at each layer of moral identity
outlined in the personological approach. This innovative inclusive methodology that
expands the scope of inquiry of moral identity development is necessary to take the field
to a higher, more sophisticated level of moral psychology that reflects the multifaceted
construct of moral identity. In the following sections, implications of the dissertation
research will be considered in order to facilitate future research in the area.
Moving Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Moral Identity Development
Identity development is shaped by macro-level and micro-level factors including
but not limited to, culture, history, and individual differences in characteristics; arguably
researchers need to consider the multiple layers of individuality when examining how
identity develops (for an overview, see Schwartz et al., 2013). Consequently, the current
dissertation aimed to utilize the personological approach to study moral identity
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development that draws upon the personality framework of McAdams (2009). This more
integrative and heuristic approach allows researchers to distinguish between these layers
of individuality and examine the developmental nature of moral identity. In Lapsley’s
(2015) commentary to Krettenauer and Hertz’s (2015) critical review of moral identity
development, he noted that “What we have not done is the hard work of articulating a
theory of development that yields moral identity (even as life story narratives) as an
outcome” (p. 168). Moreover, Nucci (2004) pointed out that “perhaps the biggest gap in
theory is the paucity of explanatory connection between children’s morality and the
period of early adolescence when the construction of moral identity is presumed to exert
its influence on moral responsibility” (p. 123). As the first systematic investigation into
the three layers of moral identity, I would like to propose in the following paragraphs a
more comprehensive theory of moral identity development based on our findings and in
response to both Lapsley and Nucci.
The self becomes increasingly involved in morality and moral action across the
lifespan and thus is not limited to older developmental periods. This dissertation provides
evidence in contrast to the Eriksonian perspective stating that only adolescents are
capable to construct a sense of identity given the cognitive limitations (for an overview,
see Kroger, 2007). Now that it is evident that there are three layers to moral identity
similar to personal identity (see Schwartz et al., 2013), it is important to keep in mind that
“some aspects of morality are in place both before and after adolescence” (Heiphetz,
Strohminger, Gelman, & Young, 2018, p. 2). Specifically, layers of moral identity may
differentially appear before and after adolescence and become increasingly connected
throughout the lifespan. At some point in adulthood, these layers of moral identity will be
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integrated into an individual’s moral identity as a whole, similar to Damon’s (1984)
conception of moral systems being integrated into one’s sense of self by adulthood.
In order to better articulate this new general perspective of how moral identity
may manifest from middle childhood to adolescence, let us compare a moral identity in
middle childhood versus a moral identity in the adolescent years. Before we compare, in
middle childhood, individuals are more accurate in their self-appraisals given advances in
their cognitive ability to (1) appreciate negative and positive attributes, (2) use social
comparisons for their own self-evaluation, (3) differentiate between real versus ideal selfperceptions, as well as (4) enhanced perspective-taking skills that can directly impact
one’s own self-perception to be more realistic (see Harter, 2012). Thus, these cognitivedevelopmental advances as well as their increased self-awareness, self-agency, and selfcontinuity (for an overview, see Harter, 2012) make it appropriate for us to discuss and
use the concept of moral “identity” prior to adolescence. It is, however, important to keep
in mind that there are restrictions and identity may appear differently from middle
childhood to adolescence.
The moral identity of a 10-year-old consists of a high degree of self-importance of
moral values (layer one), but their self-view as a moral person appears to be more
externally or relationship driven (layer two) and there is also less self-relevance of past
moral actions (layer three). Individuals in middle childhood appear to have a strong sense
of self, but this self-view is more “external” and reflective of their parental values and
nurturing rather than a purely personal “internal” self-view. Scholars in identity research
might be reluctant to believe that identity begins forming in childhood, but it is
reasonable that by middle childhood, children may have a developing moral identity that
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is more reflective of a social moral identity. This social moral identity is based on the
desire to be the type of person who is considered a valued member of one’s community
(family, friends, school), beyond simply having a good relationship with one’s parents.
The need for a sense of belonging in one’s environment is still a priority with social
comparisons for self-evaluation occurring naturally for this age period. For example,
Bryan, Master, and Walton (2014) found that children (3- and 6-year-olds) were
motivated to pursue a positive identity given that participants who were encouraged to
“be a helper” (noun condition) helped more than participants encouraged “to help” (verb
condition). The noun condition appeared to invoke a perceived valued identity that
actually fostered helping behaviour. Bryan et al. (2014) argued that adults may
involuntarily or straightforwardly signal to children the behaviours and values that are
more relevant to defining their identity and that are also valued by adults. As such, we
propose that an individual’s social moral identity in middle childhood is likely consistent
with one’s self-view (e.g., attributes you have) but is also highly valued in social contexts
(e.g., attributes that your parents and friends also value) and thus not a fully autonomous
identity.
The moral identity of a 16-year-old, on the other hand, has a lower level of selfimportance of moral values (layer one) as the adolescent is likely reconsidering their
identity commitments derived from their parents, while also experiencing in-depth
identity exploration as they enter new environments (e.g., high school). However, the 16year-old’s moral identity appears to be moving towards a more personal, autonomous,
and internalized sense of identity with a greater degree of both internal identity
motivation (layer two) as well as greater self-relevance of past moral behaviour (layer
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three). Consequently, compared to the 16-year-old, the 10-year-old’s moral identity does
not appear to have an internal mechanism to drive their behaviour, but rather a desire to
be a valued member in their community of family, friends, teachers, peers, and
neighbours. In other words, moral identity may be more socially driven in middle
childhood and progresses to be more autonomous with age. Our view certainly aligns
with the well-established developmental research that suggests, especially at the trait
layer, identity is largely shaped during the transition period from adolescence to
adulthood through socialization as well as through the incorporation of self-definitions
that an individual attaches to themselves (e.g., Harter, 2012; Mead, 1934). Initially in
childhood and early adolescence, one’s sense of identity forms based on feelings of
belonging and commitment, as well as attitudes and values that are shared by both the
self and others’ in one’s social group (see Mrazek et al., 2015; Phinney, 1990). At some
point during the transition to adulthood, with adequate in-depth exploration and
reconsideration, individuals are able to formulate their own sense of identity based on
what is most important and most fulfilling to the self.
Past research (e.g., Kochanska et al., 2002, 2010; Krettenauer, 2018; Krettenauer
et al., 2013) has argued that young children’s moral self-concept may be a precursor to
later moral identity, but here we argue that young children’s moral self-concept may lead
to a social moral identity in middle childhood, which continues to be more autonomous
with age forming a more fully internal moral identity during the transition to adulthood.
In light of Lapsley’s (2015) request for a theory of development that yields moral identity
as an outcome (e.g., life narratives), this dissertation leads us to consider the strength of
the relationship between layers of moral identity as the overall outcome or indicator of a
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personal, autonomous and thus mature moral identity. From a developmental and
theoretical perspective, it is too simple to claim a specific layer of moral identity as the
outcome given that human development itself (including personality) is complex and thus
its explanations and outcomes are as well. Based on this dissertation, the most important
theoretical implication is that in order to fully understand and describe moral identity, we
need to consider all three layers and how they interact together over time to formulate a
cohesive and “complete” moral identity that may first emerge as a social moral identity in
middle childhood and later develops into a more autonomous, internalized moral identity.
Over the lifespan, these layers of moral identity are differentially developing and
continue to develop to be more internalized and reflect a more personal identity. Once the
trait layer, motivation and goal-oriented layer, as well as narrative layer of moral identity
are strongly connected, and thus integrated, we can conclude that one’s moral identity has
reached maturity. Empirically, researchers may examine each layer of moral identity as
an indicator of moral identity similar to Chapters I, II, and III, but it would be premature
to state that moral identity is simply only traits, or motivations, or narratives. By
connecting the layers, we are able to provide a more complete perspective on moral
identity and how it develops over time. It is important to note that these layers are not
meant to be outlined as stages to moral identity development. Instead, this more
comprehensive theory of moral identity development suggests that it is a multifaceted,
context-dependent construct and its development occurs throughout the course of the
lifespan beginning with a more social moral identity in middle childhood that becomes
more internal and autonomous over time.
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Future Directions
As discussed above, the present dissertation has many implications related to
moral identity as a construct (three layers) as well as its development from middle
childhood to adolescence. This dissertation may serve as a springboard for the many
research investigations that will come to further test the aforementioned theory of moral
identity. First, researchers need to continue this line of work across the lifespan without
limiting the scope exclusively to adolescents and adults. It is important to also
acknowledge that this dissertation project utilized a cross-sectional design and thus we
cannot make conclusive general claims about “development”. These age-related patterns
across the age groups may also be attributable to other factors other than age, such as
sample characteristics and thus we need to be cautious on how to generalize these age
patterns until longitudinal investigations have been conducted. At the same time,
Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) view that identity is a result of one’s interactions across
different levels of ecosystems in their environment from the personal and most intimate
ecological system (the microsystem consisting of family, friends, school) to the broader
cultural and societal ecological system (the macrosystem), which need to be considered
in any investigations examining identity. Additionally, the bi-directional influence that
personal relationships at the microsystem level has on the individual is important to
consider. For example, the family can influence the child’s behaviour and development,
but the child’s reactions to and interactions with the family also influences how the
family interacts with the child. It would be vital to consider how the influences that go
back and forth shape moral identity development.
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Context-specificity needs to be part of the research design regardless of
developmental age period because even at a young age, there is context-dependency in
how children reflect and understand the self and the world (i.e., family, friends, school,
immoral context, moral context). Recent work in the field has taken into account various
moral and social contexts (e.g., Krettenauer et al., 2016; Krettenauer & Victor, 2017;
Recchia et al., 2013, 2015), though not systematically in a single study like the present
dissertation project. Expanding the dimension of context-specificity is also needed in
empirical investigations to better reflect the complexity of human development across the
different ecological systems given that these systems naturally interact with and influence
one another. For instance, findings from this dissertation cannot be generalized to all
cultural contexts especially given that there are culturally specific conceptions of moral
identity (see Jia et al., in press). The present study needs to be replicated in other cultural
contexts to better understand how moral identity develops cross-culturally
(macrosystem). Finally, given the implications for moral education in how educators and
parents can foster moral understanding and moral behaviour, as well as the difference in
the school systems (e.g., Kelly, 2010), future research needs to also differentiate the
school context by examining students in public versus catholic schools (macrosystem).
The present study recruited participants from both school systems, but the number of
participants from catholic schools were too few (approximately 23% of the sample) to
adequately compare both school systems. Evidently, another layer of human complexity
needs to be considered to better understand how moral identity develops; more
specifically, the cultural context (Western versus Eastern) and school context (public
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versus catholic) may influence the development of these layers of moral identity in
important and diverse ways.
Although it is ideal to investigate all three layers together when examining moral
identity development, it may be challenging to incorporate all three layers of moral
identity into a single empirical investigation depending on the resources available to
researchers. However, as a recommendation from a developmental perspective,
researchers at the very least need to consider the second layer of moral identity as
imperative to examine for two reasons. First, internal moral identity motivation reflected
in the second layer of moral identity was the strongest link to moral behaviour and
finding ways to continue to foster this layer of moral identity is needed to promote higher
rates of moral acts and lower incidences of immoral events. At the same time, human
beings all have motivations or reasoning for their behavior, which can be tapped into
from at a relatively young age. Therefore, in terms of methodological consistency over
time, scholars need to examine one’s intentions in order to better understand their sense
of self. This type of focus will allow developmental researchers to better compare age
trends across the lifespan given that at most ages, individuals can articulate their reasons,
which we now know are context-specific.
Finally, this dissertation proposed that moral identity development may appear as
a social moral identity in middle childhood that progresses to be more internal with age,
but this has not been supported by empirical evidence. In the present dissertation,
external moral identity motivation and relationship-oriented moral identity motivation
could be considered indicators of “social moral identity”, but future research should also
incorporate methods to better access social moral identity to determine if this is indeed
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present in middle childhood. For example, future research could interview children and
adolescents and ask them how their sense of identity or the self-importance of moral
values may or may not impact close relationships in their own lives (e.g., What if your
friends did not think these were important? How would that impact how you see these
values for yourself?). This type of procedure may allow researchers to assess whether
participants’ moral identity is reflective of a social identity to uphold close relationships.
Relatedly, Heiphetz et al. (2018) found that perceptions of friendship change may play an
important role in perceived identity change and that changes in identity are likely linked
to changes in relationships. Therefore, it might be meaningful to also ask participants if
the values of their friends and family changed, how would that impact their own selfview?
Overall, in order for research in this area to continue to expand and add to the
theory of moral identity development, the following need to be accomplished: (1)
longitudinal designs from childhood to adulthood, (2) including measures that tap into
each layer of moral identity assessed at each time point to track the trajectories across and
within layers, and (3) examine environmental factors such as parent-child relationship
quality as well as parental values at the onset. These types of empirical investigations will
allow researchers to better test this developmental theory of moral identity. At the very
least, these results provide promising directions for future research in the area.
Conclusion
In summary, this dissertation provides the first comprehensive set of findings in
support of important developmental changes at each of the three layers of moral identity
across middle childhood and adolescence. Based on the empirical evidence from the
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chapters described above, a more comprehensive theory of moral identity development
was proposed suggesting that moral identity development is context-dependent and that
each layer of moral identity manifests differentially throughout the lifespan. Importantly,
it begins to emerge in middle childhood perhaps as a social moral identity and progresses
to be more internal with age.
Traits (layer one) may not be ready to be fully formed yet in middle childhood, but
warm and supportive parent-child relationships seem to nurture higher levels of moral
identity from middle childhood to adolescence. Parents may shape children to have a
strong social moral identity, which may later manifest into a more internalized moral
identity. Also, given the moderate relationship between the self-importance of moral
values (layer one) and internal moral identity motivation (layer two), perhaps by
enhancing children’s internal moral motivation we may be able to nurture developing
moral traits in adolescence and thus allow it to be further enriched in adulthood. Another
way to promote internal motivation in order to support the self-importance of moral
values in the future is for children to engage in reflections of their past moral and
immoral behaviours (layer three). Both second and third layers of moral identity have
many implications for educators and parents in understanding developmentally
appropriate ways to promote moral understanding and thus moral behavior. For example,
reflecting on past events can occur at most ages and educators and parents can help
facilitate this type of reflective processing. Moreover, reflecting on both types of morally
relevant behaviour appears to have different benefits for the development of their identity
given that prosocial events may help to confirm their sense of self and reflecting on
transgressive events aids in changing one’s self-view in light of a transgressive act.
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Taken together, this dissertation suggests that there are three layers of moral
identity that develop across the lifespan. Future theory and research on moral identity
need to consider these three layers and that it is important and possible to nurture the
development of each layer of moral identity beginning in middle childhood in order to
better predict moral behaviour. In our current political global climate, it is increasingly
important to cultivate moral citizens who are accepting and understanding of others and
thus are more likely to disengage from immoral acts.
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Appendix A: Social Desirability
Below you find a list of statements. Please read each statement carefully and decide if that statement
describes you or not. If it describes you, check the box for “True”; if not, check “False”.
Yes

No

Have you ever felt like saying unkind things to a person? …………………..……….......

❒

❒

Are you always careful about keeping your clothing neat and your room picked up? .......

❒

❒

Do you sometimes feel like staying home from school even if you are not sick? ……......

❒

❒

Do you ever say anything that makes somebody else feel bad? …..………………………

❒

❒

Are you always polite, even to people who are not very nice? …………………………...

❒

❒

Sometimes, do you do things you’ve been told not to do? ……………………………......

❒

❒

Do you always listen to your parents? ……………………………….……………………

❒

❒

Do you sometimes wish you could just play around instead of having to go to school? …

❒

❒

Have you ever broken a rule? ……………………………………………………………..

❒

❒

Do you sometimes feel angry when you don’t get your way? …………………………….

❒

❒

Do you sometimes feel like making fun of other people? ….…………………………......

❒

❒

Do you always do the right things? ..………………………………………………………

❒

❒

Are there sometimes when you don’t like to do what your parents tell you? ………..…....

❒

❒

Do you sometimes get mad when people don’t do what you want them to do? ..…………

❒

❒
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Appendix B: Parent-Child Relationship Quality Questionnaire
Everyone has a number of people who are important in his or her life. The following
questions are about you and your relationship with your mother. Please tell me:
How much do you and your mother get upset with or mad at each other?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much do you and your mother get on each other’s nerves?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much does your mother treat you like you’re admired and respected?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How sure are you that the relationship with your mother will last no matter what?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much do you play around and have fun with your mother?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much do you and your mother disagree and quarrel?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much does your mother help you figure out or fix things?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much do you and your mother get annoyed with each other’s behavior?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much do you share your secrets and private feelings with your mother?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much does your mother really care about you?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much do you and your mother argue with each other?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much do you and your mother hassle or nag one another?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much do you take care of your mother?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
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Now, let's talk about the relationship with your father.
How much do you and your father get upset with or mad at each other?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much do you and your father get on each other’s nerves?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much does your father treat you like you’re admired and respected?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How sure are you that the relationship with your father will last no matter what?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much do you play around and have fun with your father?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much do you and your father disagree and quarrel?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much does your father help you figure out or fix things?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much do you and your father get annoyed with each other’s behaviour?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much do you share your secrets and private feelings with your father?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much does your father really care about you?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much do you and your father argue with each other?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much do you and your father hassle or nag one another?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
How much do you take care of your father?
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much
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Appendix C: Teacher-Report of Moral Behaviour

1. Tends to react to other student’s distress
by teasing them or making things worse.
2. Seems concerned when other students are
distressed.
3. Is an aggressive student.
4. Taunts and teases other students.
5. Threatens other students.
6. Is kind toward other students.
7. Listens to other students.
8. Compromises in conflicts with other
students.
9. Is cooperative with other students.
10. Loses temper easily in conflicts with
other students.
11. Argues with other students.
12. Is friendly toward other students.
13. Annoys or irritates other students.
14. Disrupts other student’s activities.
15. Shows concern for moral issues (e.g.,
fairness, welfare of others).
16. Offers help or comfort when other
students are upset.
17. Will continue to bother or hurt other
students even when they are clearly upset.
18. Considerate of other people’s feelings.
19. Often loses temper.
20. Helpful if someone is hurt, upset, or
feeling ill.
21. Generally not well behaved.

Not
True
0

Sometimes
True
1

Certainly
True
2

0

1

2

0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2

0
0

1
1

2
2

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2

0

1

2

0

1

2

0
0
0

1
1
1

2

0

1

2

2
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22. Often offers to help others (parents,
teachers, students).
23. Often fights with other children or
bullies them.
24. Shares readily with other students (e.g.,
books, games).
25. Often lies or cheats.
26. Steals from home, school, or elsewhere.
27. Kind to younger students.

118
0

1
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0

1

2

0

1
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0
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1
1

2
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Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample Across Age Groups
MidMiddle Childhood

Early Adolescence

Adolescence

(8-11 years)

(12-14 years)

(15-17 years)

Total

65

68

57

190

26 (40.00)

38 (55.88)

25 (43.86)

89 (46.84)

10.11 (0.71)

13.26 (0.53)

16.00 (0.67)

13.00 (2.58)

European Canadian: n (%)b

47 (74.60)

39 (58.20)

37 (64.91)

123 (65.78)

Socioeconomic status (ISEI)

50.83 (17.29)

60.45 (14.43)

58.75 (15.57)

56.71 (16.26)

n
Male: n (%)a
Age in years (SD)

Note. ISEI = International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status.
a

Percentage refers to within column.

b

Total number of participants for European Canadian is n = 187 given that there are n = 3 missing data.
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Table 2
Results of Regression Analyses Predicting Mean-Level and Cross-Context Differentiation of Moral Identity by Age and Social
Desirability Response Bias
Moral identity: Mean-level
Step 1

Moral identity: Cross-context differentiation

Step 2

Step 1

Predictors/controls

β

t

β

t

β

t

β

t

Age1 (Grade 7-8)

-.15

-1.71+

-.05

-.53

.16

1.78+

.08

.83

Age2 (Grade 10-11)

-.30

-3.55**

-.21

-2.48*

.25

2.86**

.18

2.03*

-.18

-2.32*

-.18

-2.39*

Social desirability

.30

3.92***

Ethnicitya

DR2

.069**

.078***

Note. N = 172.
a

Step 2

Ethnicity was only added to the main analyses with cross-context differentiation.

***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10.

.048*

.057**

MORAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT

143

Table 3
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample Across Age Groups
MidMiddle Childhood

Early Adolescence

Adolescence

(8-11 years)

(12-14 years)

(15-17 years)

Total

65

66

57

188

26 (40.00)

36 (54.55)

25 (43.86)

87 (46.28)

10.11 (0.71)

13.26 (0.53)

16.00 (0.67)

12.99 (2.59)

European Canadian: n (%)b

47 (74.60)

37 (56.92)

37 (64.91)

121 (65.41)

Socioeconomic status (ISEI)

50.83 (17.29)

60.21 (14.58)

58.75 (15.57)

56.59 (16.30)

n
Male: n (%)a
Age in years (SD)

Note. ISEI = International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status.
a

Percentage refers to within column.

b

Total number of participants for European Canadian is n = 187 given that there are n = 3 missing data.
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Table 4
Coding Categories for Moral Identity Motivation
Coding

Category

category

group

Standards and

E

rules

Definition
Being moral based on following
standards and rules of others.

Interview example

%a

“My parents raised me to be an honest,
trustworthy, person. And I feel that it’s
2.76
important to just live up to their standards.”
(ID151, Grade 10, Male, 15-years-old)

Self-interest

E

Being moral is instrumental in

“Because I don’t want to be in trouble, or get

staying out of trouble and/or

suspended, or go into detention, because

gaining rewards or getting ahead

you only just sit there for an hour or two.”

in life. Primary motive to be

(ID006, Grade 4, Male, 9-years-old)

moral is based on positive
and/or negative consequences to
the self.

16.74

MORAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT
Reputation

E

Being moral is important for leaving

145
“I like to be known well by other people like my

good impressions on others

friends or family friends, so I want to be

and/or avoiding bad

known as a good person when I grow up

impressions.

and they will remember me for a long time

7.99

and they will always think of me when they
look back through their lives.” (ID121,
Grade 8, Male, 13-years-old)
Consequences-

R

relationships

Being moral is important

“Because I would be building good relationships

establishing trust, maintaining

where we trust each other and we know we

good relationships with others,

can confide in one another.” (ID147, Grade

and ensuring social groups are

10, Male, 15-years-old)

20.89

functioning well.
Consequencesothers

I

Being moral is important for others’
well-being.

“Because I don't want people to feel bad or I don't
want to hurt their feelings.” (ID044, Grade
5, Female, 10-years-old)

12.29
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Fairness-related

I

Being moral is important so that

146
“I want to be treated that way as well. So I think

everyone is treated the same

those ones are the most important for me to

way you want to be treated.

be that way because I wouldn’t want to be

16.28

like disrespected or not accepted.” (ID125,
Grade 8, Female, 13-years-old)
Relationship
ideals

I

Being moral is essential and

“It’ll create like a happy, loving environment…a

reflective of the type of relationship

happy, accepting environment having these

or community one wants to have.

three things; that’s where people would
want to be. I want to be this way because I
11.21
think it would build a school that I’d want
to go to and a school I’d be happy to go to
every day.” (ID140, Grade 10, Male, 15years-old)
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Role model

I

Being moral is important to set a

147
“I have to be responsible because I’m the oldest

good example for others and/or teach

and I have to take care and make sure I do

others about moral values.

the right thing. Because the younger
students, they look up to the older students

4.15

and if I’m not responsible, they’re not going
to be either so I have to be that.” (ID081,
Grade 8, Female, 13-years-old)
Self ideals

I

Being moral reflects the type of
person one hopes to be.

“It’s important to me because I think it’s basically
what every human should do, it’s not right
if you get rid of one of these things and you
don’t really care about your family with one
7.68
of these traits…these are all the things that
you should look for in a person and it seems
just natural, just to find these qualities in a
human being.” (ID121, Grade 8, Male, 13-
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years-old)

Note. E = external; I = internal; R = relationship-oriented
a

Percentage based on total number of coded responses (N = 651)
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Table 5
Means (and Standard Deviations and Ranges) for Moral Identity Motivation Category
Groups Across Contexts
Context
Motivation

Family

Friends

School

External

.38a,x (.52, 0-2)

.17b,x (.39, 0-2)

.76c,x (.63, 0-2)

Relationship-oriented

.40a,x (.49, 0-1)

.57b,y (.50, 0-1)

.15c,y (.36, 0-1)

Internal

.90a,y (.73, 0-3)

.91a,z (.75, 0-3)

.78a,x (.76, 0-3)

N = 188
a,b,c

Means in the same row with different superscripts are significantly different (t-test, p

< .004)
x,y,z

Means in the same column with different superscripts are significantly different

(pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction, p < .001)
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Table 6
Bivariate Correlations Between Moral Identity Motivation Category Groups Across Contexts
Context
Context

Family

Friends

Family

-.12E-R / -.20R-I** / -.36E-I***

Friends

.26E*** / .10R / .24I***

-.09E-R / -.49R-I** / -.19E-I*

School

.41E*** / .17R* / .32I***

.08E / .28R*** / .26I***

School

-.02E-R / -.16R-I* / -.51E-I***

Note. N’s ranged from 185 to 188 due to some missing data. Category groups of moral identity motivation: E = external; R =
relationship=-oriented; I = internal. Coefficients along the diagonal represent correlations of category groups within contexts.
Coefficients below the diagonal represent correlations of category groups across contexts. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.
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Table 7
Bivariate Correlations Between Study Variables and Demographic Characteristics
Moral Identity Motivation

Moral Behaviour

Relationship
External

Prosocial

Antisocial

Internal
-Oriented

Behaviours Behaviours

Self-importance of moral values

-.04

.12

.07

.07

-.11

Social desirability

.02

.11

-.08

-.01

-.04

Socioeconomic status (ISEI)

-.10

-.06

.14

.08

-.15*

Ethnicity (European Canadian): 1 (yes), 0 (no)

.08

.05

-.04

-.06

.11

Gender: 1 (female), 2 (male)

.03

-.08

-.08

-.22**

.25**

Note. Moral identity motivations (external, relationship-oriented, and internal) represent overall motivation scores across all social
contexts. ISEI = International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status. N’s ranged from 170 to 189 due to some missing data.
**p < .01, *p < .05.
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Table 8
Bivariate Correlations Between Study Variables
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. External
2. Relationship-oriented

.06

3. Internal

-.45***

-.39***

4. Prosocial behaviour

-.02

-.11

5. Antisocial behaviour

.14+

.19**

6. Parental support

-.09

.10

.06

.18*

.06

7. Parent-child negative interaction

.03

-.14+

.11

-.06

-.01

.17*
-.29***

-.63***

-.38***

Note. Moral identity motivations (external, relationship-oriented, and internal) represent overall motivation scores across all social
contexts. N’s ranged from 169 to 189 due to some missing data. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10.
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Table 9
Bivariate Correlations Between Motivation Coding Categories and Age (in years)
RelationshipExternal

Internal
Oriented

SelfStandards

Consequences-

-.17*

Role

Self

Reputation
Interest

Age (in years)

Consequences- Fairness- Relationship

-.26***

.12+

Note. N = 188. ***p < .001, *p < .05, +p < .10.

Relationship

Others

Related

Ideals

-.31***

-.13+

.29***

.39***

Model Ideal
.14+

.09
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Table 10
Moral Identity Motivation by Age Group and Social Contexts: Results of Mixed-Model
MANOVA
df

F

h2p

Motivation

2, 181

55.72***

.38

Context

2, 181

.25

.00

Age group

2, 179

.45

.01

Motivation x Age group

4, 364

9.07***

.09

Motivation x Context

4, 179

50.86***

.53

Age group x Context

4, 364

.43

.01

Motivation x Age group x Context

8, 360

1.44

.03

Note. All F-values reported are based on Pillai’s Trace test statistic given that it is
considered the most robust. Other test statistics (Wilk’s Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace,
Roy’s Largest Root) yielded slightly different F-values for some interactions, but all pvalues reached the same level of statistical significance. ***p < .001, +p < .10.
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Table 11
Means (and Standard Errors) for Moral Identity Motivation by Age Group
Middle Childhood

Early Adolescence

Mid-Adolescence

(Grade 4/5; 9-11

(Grade 7/8; 12-14

(Grade 10/11; 15-

Motivation

years old)

years old)

17 years old)

External

.17a (.14)

.16a (.13)

.10b (.14)

Relationship-oriented

.49a (.11)

.37a,b (.11)

.25b (.11)

Internal

.13a (.19)

.17a (.19)

.23b (.20)

Note. N = 187.
a,b

Means in the same row with different superscripts indicate significant group differences

(post-hoc Scheffé; p < .05).
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Table 12
Results of Regression Analyses Predicting Moral Identity Motivation by Parent-Child Relationship Quality and SES
External
Step 1

Relationship-Oriented

Step 2

Step 1

Step 2

Internal
Step 1

Step 2

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

Parental support

-.10

.02

-.10

.02

.05

.05

.05

.05

.11

.02

.12

.02

Parent-child negative interaction

-.01

.02

-.01

.12

-.12

.05

-.12

.05

.15

.02

.16+

.02

-.10

.00

-.06

.00

.11

.00

Socioeconomic status (ISEI)

DR2

.01

.01

.02

.00

Note. N = 167. ISEI = International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status. +p < .10.

.02

.01
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Table 13
Results of Regression Analyses Predicting Moral Behaviour by Moral Identity Motivation, SES, and Gender
Prosocial Behaviour
Step 1

Antisocial Behaviour

Step 2

Step 1

Step 2

β

SE

β

SE

β

SE

β

SE

.04

.29

.03

.28

.02

.24

.03

.23

Relationship-oriented

-.05

.11

-.07

.11

.10

.10

.13+

.09

Internal

.16+

.36

.13

.36

.31

-.19*

.30

.03

.00

-.10

.00

-.19*

.06

External

Socioeconomic status (ISEI)
Gender

DR2

.030

.038*

-.23**

.23**

.088**

.05

.068**

Note. N = 184. ISEI = International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status. **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10.
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Table 14
Bivariate Correlations Between Study Variables and Demographic Characteristics with Means and Standard Deviations
Type of harmful and helpful
actions

Reasons for harmful or helpful actions
Response
Psycho-

Self-

Other-

to others’

Un-

Self-event

Material

Physical

logical

External

interested

interested

actions

intentional

connection

.02

.02

-.07

-.00

-.16*

.05

-.01

.02

.04

SES

-.07

-.05

.17*

.02

.07

.04

-.05

.03

.17*

Mean

1.02

.73

2.41

.13

1.01

1.32

1.33

.58

1.85

.93

.90

1.16

.39

.87

.75

1.01

.68

1.94

Social
desirability

SD

Note. Narrative coding categories represent scores across all social (family, friends) and moral (harm, help) contexts. SES =
socioeconomic status measured by the ISEI = International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status.
N’s ranged from 170 to 186 due to some missing data. *p < .05.
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Table 15
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Types of Harmful and Helpful Actions by Age
Group
Middle

Early

Mid-

Childhood

Adolescence

Adolescence

(Grade 4/5;

(Grade 7/8;

(Grade 10/11;

9-11 years old)

12-14 years old)

15-17 years old)

.95a (.90)

.98a (.91)

1.14a (.99)

Physical

1.03a (.94)

.62b (.91)

.51b (.76)

Psychological or emotional

2.03a (1.17)

2.49a,b (1.20)

2.75b (.99)

Type
Material or concrete

Note. N = 186.
a,b

Means in the same row with different superscripts indicate significant group differences

(post-hoc Scheffé; p < .05).
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Table 16
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Types of Harmful and Helpful Actions Across
Moral Contexts
Type

Harmful Acts

Helpful Acts

Material or concrete

.22a,x (.46)

.82b,x (.75)

Physical

.28a,x (.50)

.45b,y (.66)

1.52a,y (.64)

.91b,x (.80)

Psychological or emotional
Note. N = 184.
a,b

Means in the same row with different superscripts indicate significant group differences

(t-tests; p < .003).
x,y,z

Means in the same column with different superscripts are significantly different

(pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction, p < .001)
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Table 17
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Types of Harmful and Helpful Actions Across
Social Contexts
Type

Family

Friends

Material or concrete

.63a,x (.64)

.40b,x (.55)

Physical

.39a,y (.59)

.35a,x (.56)

1.19a,z (.70)

1.26a,y (.71)

Psychological or emotional
Note. N = 182.
a,b

Means in the same row with different superscripts indicate significant group differences

(t-tests; p < .001).
x,y,z

Means in the same column with different superscripts are significantly different

(pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction, p < .005)
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Table 18
Overall Means (and Standard Deviations) for Reasons of Harmful and Helpful Actions
Type

M

SD

External constraints

.13a

.39

Self-interested

1.01b

.87

Other-interested

1.32c

.75

Response to others’ actions

1.33c,b

1.02

.58d

.68

Unintentional
Note. N = 186.
a,b,c,d

Means in the same column with different superscripts are significantly different

(pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction, p < .05)
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Table 19
Bivariate Correlations Between Key Variables of Each Layer of Moral Identity Controlling for Age (Zero-Order Correlations in
Parentheses)
1

2

3

4

5

1. Mean-level of moral identity
(layer 1)
2. Internal moral identity
.14+ (.04)
motivation (layer 2)
3. External moral identity
-.08 (-.03)

-.40*** (-.45***)

motivation (layer 2)
4. Self-event connection
.09 (-.02)

.18* (.31***)

-.05 (-.13+)

5. Prosocial behaviour

.09 (.07)

.14+ (.17*)

-.00 (-.02)

6. Antisocial behaviour

-.18* (-.09)

(layer 3)

-.19* (-.29***)

.08 (.14+)

.03 (.07)
-.08 (-.19**)

-.64*** (-.64***)

6
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Note. Moral identity motivations (external and internal) represent overall motivation scores across all social contexts (family, friends,
school). N’s ranged from 181 to 184 due to some missing data. Partial correlations were also performed controlling for gender and the
coefficients were very similar and significance levels remained the same. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10.
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Think about yourself:

Think about yourself:

How important is it for you to be _____ with your family?

How important is it for you to be _____ with your friends?

Extremely
Important to Me

Extremely
Important to Me

Very Important to Me

Very Important to Me

Important to Me

Important to Me

Somewhat Important to Me

Somewhat Important to Me

Not Important to Me

Not Important to Me

Figure 1. Diagrams of the family (blue) and friends (green) contexts to represent varying
degrees of self-importance of moral values wherein participants placed each moral value
label in the circle that represents its level of importance to the self.
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1.2
1

Sum Score

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0

Middle childhood
Standards and rules

Early adolescence
Self-interest

Mid-adolescence
Reputation

Figure 2. External moral identity motivation category groups across social contexts by
age group.
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1.60
1.40

Sum Score

1.20
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00

Middle childhood
Consequences-others
Role model

Early adolescence
Fairness-related
Self ideals

Mid-adolescence
Relationship ideals

Figure 3. Internal moral identity motivation category groups across social contexts by
age group.
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Harm Narratives
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

External

Self-Interested Other-interested
Family

Response to
others' actions

Unintentional

Response to
others' actions

Unintentional

Friends

Help Narratives
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

External

Self-Interested Other-interested
Family

Friends

Figure 4. Mean scores of reasons for engaging in harmful/helpful actions by social
contexts.
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3.5
3

Sum Score

2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0

None/Dismissal
Middle childhood

Implicit

Explicit (confirm)

Early adolescence

Explicit (change)

Mid-adolescence

Figure 5. Self-event connection across social contexts and moral contexts by age group.

